APPENDIX F:

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF OPTIONS FOR CONVERSION OF UF$_6$ TO OXIDE OR METAL

CONTENTS (APPENDIX F)

CONTENTS (Cont.)

TABLES

TABLES (Cont.)

TABLES (Cont.)

FIGURE

NOTATION (APPENDIX F)

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations, including units of measure, used in this document. Some acronyms used only in tables are defined in those tables.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

General

CFR	*Code of Federal Regulations*
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
LCF	latent cancer fatality
LLMW	low-level mixed waste
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLW	low-level radioactive waste
MEI	maximally exposed individual
NEPA	*National Environmental Policy Act*
NPDES	National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PEIS	programmatic environmental impact statement
PM$_{10}$	particulate matter with a mean diameter of 10 µm or less
ROI	region of influence

Chemicals

AlF$_3$	aluminum trifluoride
CaF$_2$	calcium fluoride
CO	carbon monoxide
Fe	iron
HC	hydrocarbons
HF	hydrogen fluoride
HNO$_3$	nitric acid
Mg	magnesium
MgF$_2$	magnesium fluoride
NO$_2$	nitrogen dioxide
NO$_x$	nitrogen oxides
TCE	trichloroethylene
SO$_2$	sulfur dioxide
UF$_4$	uranium tetrafluoride
UF$_6$	uranium hexafluoride

UO$_2$	uranium dioxide
UO$_2$F$_2$	uranyl fluoride
U$_3$O$_8$	triuranium octaoxide (uranyl uranate)

UNITS OF MEASURE

°F	degree(s) Fahrenheit	µg	microgram(s)
Ci	curie(s)	m	meter(s)
cm	centimeter(s)	m^3	cubic meter(s)
cm^3	cubic centimeter(s)	mg	milligram(s)
d	day(s)	min	minute(s)
ft	foot (feet)	mrem	millirem(s)
ft^2	square foot (feet)	MW	megawatt(s)
g	gram(s)	MWh	megawatt hour(s)
gal	gallon(s)	pCi	picocurie(s)
gpm	gallon(s) per minute	ppm	part(s) per million
GWh	gigawatt hour(s)	psia	pound(s) per square inch absolute
ha	hectare(s)	rad	radiation absorbed dose(s)
in.	inch(es)	rem	roentgen equivalent man
kg	kilogram(s)	s	second(s)
km	kilometer(s)	scf	standard cubic foot (feet)
L	liter(s)	ton(s)	short ton(s)
lb	pound(s)	yr	year(s)

APPENDIX F:

**ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF OPTIONS FOR CONVERSION
OF UF$_6$ TO OXIDE OR METAL**

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing to develop a strategy for long-term management of the depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF$_6$) inventory currently stored at three DOE sites in Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) describes alternative strategies that could be used for the long-term management of this material and analyzes the potential environmental consequences of implementing each strategy for the period 1999 through 2039. This appendix provides detailed information describing the conversion options considered in the PEIS. The discussion provides background information for the conversion options, as well as a summary of the estimated environmental impacts associated with each option.

Conversion of depleted UF$_6$ to another chemical form is required for most alternative management strategies. Three different conversion options have been considered in the PEIS: (1) conversion to triuranium octaoxide (U$_3$O$_8$),

---

Conversion Options

Conversion of depleted UF$_6$ to another chemical form is required for a number of storage, use, and disposal management alternatives. The principal conversion options considered in the PEIS are as follows:

Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. This chemical form is a stable, low-solubility oxide considered for storage and disposal. Two different technologies were considered for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$.

Conversion to UO$_2$. This stable, low-solubility oxide is considered for storage, disposal, and potential use as shielding material. Three different technologies were considered for conversion to UO$_2$.

Conversion to Metal. Metallic depleted uranium is considered for use as shielding material. Two different technologies were considered for conversion to metal.

---

(2) conversion to uranium dioxide (UO$_2$), and (3) conversion to uranium metal. The specific conversion option considered under each of the alternatives is shown in Table F.1. Because of their high chemical stability and low solubility, uranium oxides (i.e., U$_3$O$_8$ and UO$_2$) are considered for the storage and disposal alternatives. High-density UO$_2$ and uranium metal are considered for the use alternatives (e.g., spent nuclear fuel radiation shielding applications). Other details concerning the characteristics of the different chemical forms of uranium are given in Appendix A.

Conversion of depleted UF$_6$ to another chemical form would take place at a stand-alone industrial plant dedicated to the conversion process. A representative conversion plant layout is shown in Figure F.1; the actual plant layout would depend on the specific conversion option and technology selected, as well as on certain site characteristics. In general, the plant would be capable of receiving depleted UF$_6$ cylinders on trucks or railcars, temporarily storing a small inventory of

TABLE F.1 Summary of the Conversion Options Considered for Each Programmatic Management Alternative

Option	No Action	Long-Term Storage		Use		Disposal
		UF$_6$	Oxide	Uranium Oxide	Uranium Metal	
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	X	–	–	X
Conversion to UO$_2$	–	–	X	X	–	X
Conversion to metal	–	–	–	–	X	–

Option Considered for Management Alternative[a]

[a] X = option considered; – = option not considered.

full cylinders, processing the depleted UF$_6$ to another chemical form, and storing the converted uranium product and any other products until shipment off-site. The empty cylinders would be stored until transfer to a cylinder treatment facility, which is assumed to be located at the conversion plant site. It is estimated that a typical conversion plant would cover an area of approximately 20 acres (8 ha) (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL] 1997).

In general, potential environmental impacts would occur (1) during construction of a conversion facility, (2) during operations of the facility, and (3) during postulated accidents. The potential impacts associated with facility construction would result from typical land-clearing and construction activities. Potential impacts during operations would occur primarily to workers during handling operations and to the public as a result of routine releases of small amounts of contaminants through exhaust stacks and treated liquid effluent discharges. In addition, potential impacts to workers and the public from processing or storage might occur as a result of accidents that release hazardous materials.

The environmental impacts from the conversion options were evaluated based on the information described in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997). For each of the three conversion options (conversion to U$_3$O$_8$, UO$_2$, or metal), the engineering analysis report provides preconceptual facility design data, including descriptions of facility layouts; resource requirements; estimates of effluents, wastes, and emissions; and estimates of potential accident scenarios. Within each conversion option, several technologies or chemical processes that could be used to produce the same uranium end product are described (two are considered for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$, three for conversion to UO$_2$, and two for conversion to metal). Some of these technologies have not been demonstrated on a commercial scale but were considered to provide an estimate of the range of the

FIGURE F.1 Representative Site Layout for a Conversion Facility

environmental impacts that might be associated with each of the conversion options. All facility designs were based on a single plant sized to process the entire inventory of DOE-generated depleted UF$_6$ cylinders over a 20-year period (approximately 2,300 cylinders per year).

F.1 SUMMARY OF CONVERSION OPTION IMPACTS

A summary of the potential environmental impacts associated with the conversion options is provided in this section. These potential impacts are not site-specific because the location of a conversion facility, if required at all, would not be decided until some time in the future. For assessment purposes, the environmental impacts were determined for a range of environmental conditions represented by those at the three current depleted UF$_6$ storage sites.

The potential environmental impacts for the three conversion options are compared in Table F.2. For each conversion option, the potential environmental impacts are presented as a range within each area of impact. This range is intended to provide a reasonable estimate of the magnitude of impacts, taking into account the uncertainty relative to the specific technologies and sites that could ultimately be selected for conversion. The range of impacts results from two factors: (1) fundamental differences among the technologies within each conversion option; and (2) differences in the conditions at the three representative sites that were evaluated. A more detailed assessment of specific technologies and site conditions will be conducted, as appropriate, as part of the second phase (tier) of the programmatic *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) approach. Additional discussion and details related to the assessment methodologies and results for individual areas of impact are provided in the remaining sections of this appendix.

F.2 DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS

This section provides a brief summary of the different conversion options considered in the assessment of conversion impacts (Table F.3). The information is based on preconceptual design data provided in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997). The engineering analysis report includes much more detailed information, such as descriptions of facility layouts; resource requirements; estimates of effluents, wastes, and emissions; and estimates of potential accident scenarios.

All of the conversion options would involve the removal of depleted UF$_6$ from the storage cylinders, resulting in a large number of empty cylinders. These empty cylinders would contain approximately 22 lb (10 kg) of depleted UF$_6$ (Charles et al. 1991), called "heels." For assessment purposes, it has been assumed that a cylinder treatment facility would be constructed to wash the empty cylinders. This facility has been assumed to be an independent, or "stand-alone," facility, although it could be integrated directly into the design of the conversion plant. The facility would be co-located with the conversion plant.

TABLE F.2 Summary of Conversion Option Impacts

Impacts from Conversion to U_3O_8	Impacts from Conversion to UO_2	Impacts from Conversion to Metal	Impacts from Cylinder Treatment[a]
Human Health – Normal Operations: Radiological			
Involved Workers: Total collective dose: 820 person-rem	**Involved Workers:** Total collective dose: 980 – 1,100 person-rem	**Involved Workers:** Total collective dose: 650 – 1,300 person-rem	**Involved Workers:** Total collective dose: 320 person-rem
Total number of LCFs: 0.3 LCF	Total number of LCFs: 0.4 LCF	Total number of LCFs: 0.3 – 0.5 LCF	Total number of LCFs: 0.1 LCF
Noninvolved Workers: Annual dose to MEI: $1.6 \times 10^{-3} – 5.8 \times 10^{-3}$ mrem/yr	**Noninvolved Workers:** Annual dose to MEI: $3.2 \times 10^{-3} – 2.2 \times 10^{-2}$ mrem/yr	**Noninvolved Workers:** Annual dose to MEI: $6.8 \times 10^{-4} – 1.7 \times 10^{-2}$ mrem/yr	**Noninvolved Workers:** Annual dose to MEI: $4.9 \times 10^{-6} – 1.8 \times 10^{-5}$ mrem/yr
Annual cancer risk to MEI: $6 \times 10^{-10} – 2 \times 10^{-9}$ per year	Annual cancer risk to MEI: $1 \times 10^{-9} – 9 \times 10^{-9}$ per year	Annual cancer risk to MEI: $3 \times 10^{-10} – 7 \times 10^{-9}$ per year	Annual cancer risk to MEI: $2 \times 10^{-12} – 7 \times 10^{-12}$ per year
Total collective dose: 0.043 – 0.09 person-rem	Total collective dose: 0.084 – 0.34 person-rem	Total collective dose: 0.018 – 0.27 person-rem	Total collective dose: $1.3 \times 10^{-4} – 2.7 \times 10^{-4}$ person-rem
Total number of LCFs: $2 \times 10^{-5} – 4 \times 10^{-5}$ LCF	Total number of LCFs: $3 \times 10^{-5} – 1 \times 10^{-4}$ LCF	Total number of LCFs: $7 \times 10^{-6} – 1 \times 10^{-4}$ LCF	Total number of LCFs: $5 \times 10^{-8} – 1 \times 10^{-7}$ LCF
General Public: Annual dose to MEI: $4.9 \times 10^{-3} – 8.8 \times 10^{-3}$ mrem/yr	**General Public:** Annual dose to MEI: $9.7 \times 10^{-3} – 3.3 \times 10^{-2}$ mrem/yr	**General Public:** Annual dose to MEI: $2.1 \times 10^{-3} – 2.6 \times 10^{-2}$ mrem/yr	**General Public:** Annual dose to MEI: $1.5 \times 10^{-5} – 2.7 \times 10^{-5}$ mrem/yr
Annual cancer risk to MEI: $2 \times 10^{-9} – 4 \times 10^{-9}$ per year	Annual cancer risk to MEI: $5 \times 10^{-9} – 2 \times 10^{-8}$ per year	Annual cancer risk to MEI: $1 \times 10^{-9} – 1 \times 10^{-8}$ per year	Annual cancer risk to MEI: $8 \times 10^{-12} – 1 \times 10^{-11}$ per year
Total collective dose to population within 50 miles: 0.79 – 2.7 person-rem	Total collective dose to population within 50 miles: 1.6 – 10 person-rem	Total collective dose to population within 50 miles: 0.34 – 8.0 person-rem	Total collective dose to population within 50 miles: 0.0024 – 0.0082 person-rem
Total number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.0004 – 0.001 LCF	Total number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.0008 – 0.005 LCF	Total number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.0002 – 0.004 LCF	Total number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: $1 \times 10^{-6} – 4 \times 10^{-6}$ LCF

TABLE F.2 (Cont.)

Impacts from Conversion to U_3O_8	Impacts from Conversion to UO_2	Impacts from Conversion to Metal	Impacts from Cylinder Treatment[a]

Human Health – Normal Operations: Chemical

Noninvolved Workers: No impacts	**Noninvolved Workers:** No impacts	**Noninvolved Workers:** No impacts	**Noninvolved Workers:** No impacts
General Public: No impacts	**General Public:** No impacts	**General Public:** No impacts	**General Public:** No impacts

Human Health – Accidents: Radiological

Bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years	Bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years	Bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years	Bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years
Noninvolved Workers: Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 9.2 rem	**Noninvolved Workers:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 2.3 rem	**Noninvolved Workers:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 0.02 rem	**Noninvolved Workers:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 0.43 rem
Risk of LCF to MEI: 4×10^{-3}	Risk of LCF to MEI: 9×10^{-4}	Risk of LCF to MEI: 8×10^{-6}	Risk of LCF to MEI: 2×10^{-4}
Collective dose: 840 person-rem	Collective dose: 210 person-rem	Collective dose: 7.5 person-rem	Collective dose: 38 person-rem
Number of LCFs: 0.3	Number of LCFs: 0.08	Number of LCFs: 3×10^{-3}	Number of LCFs: 0.02
General Public: Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 0.27 rem	**General Public:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 0.068 rem	**General Public:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 0.015 rem	**General Public:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence): Dose to MEI: 0.013 rem
Risk of LCF to MEI: 1×10^{-4}	Risk of LCF to MEI: 3×10^{-5}	Risk of LCF to MEI: 7×10^{-6}	Risk of LCF to MEI: 7×10^{-6}
Collective dose to population within 50 miles: 20 person-rem	Collective dose to population within 50 miles: 5.1 person-rem	Collective dose to population within 50 miles: 56 person-rem	Collective dose to population within 50 miles: 2.5 person-rem
Number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.01 LCF	Number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.003 LCF	Number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.03 LCF	Number of LCFs in population within 50 miles: 0.001 LCF

TABLE F.2 (Cont.)

Impacts from Conversion to U₃O₈	Impacts from Conversion to UO₂	Impacts from Conversion to Metal	Impacts from Cylinder Treatment[a]

Human Health – Accidents: Chemical

Bounding accident frequency: less than once in 1 million years	Bounding accident frequency: less than once in 1 million years	Bounding accident frequency: less than once in 1 million years	Bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years
Noninvolved Workers: Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):	**Noninvolved Workers:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):	**Noninvolved Workers:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):	**Noninvolved Workers:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):
Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 1,100 persons	Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 1,100 persons	Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 1,100 persons	Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 1 person
Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects (bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years): 440 persons	Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects (bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years): 440 persons	Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects (bounding accident frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years): 440 persons	Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects: 0 persons
General Public: Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):	**General Public:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):	**General Public:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):	**General Public:** Bounding accident consequences (per occurrence):
Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 41,000 persons	Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 41,000 persons	Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 41,000 persons	Number of persons with potential for adverse effects: 0 persons
Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects: 1,700 persons	Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects: 1,700 persons	Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects: 1,700 persons	Number of persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects: 0 persons

Human Health — Accidents: Physical Hazards

Construction and Operations: All Workers: Less than 1 (0.35) fatality, approximately 290 injuries	**Construction and Operations: All Workers:** Less than 1 (0.59) fatality, approximately 490 injuries	**Construction and Operations: All Workers:** Less than 1 (0.55) fatality, approximately 490 injuries	**Construction and Operations: All Workers:** Less than 1 (0.19) fatality, approximately 170 injuries

TABLE F.2 (Cont.)

Impacts from Conversion to U_3O_8	Impacts from Conversion to UO_2	Impacts from Conversion to Metal	Impacts from Cylinder Treatment[a]

Air Quality

Construction:
24-hour PM_{10} concentration potentially as large as 65% of standard. Concentrations of other criteria pollutants all below 15% of respective standards.

Operations:
8-hour CO concentration potentially as large as 3% of standard.

Construction:
24-hour PM_{10} concentration potentially as large as 90% of standard. Concentrations of other criteria pollutants all below 30% of respective standards.

Operations:
8-hour CO concentration potentially as large as 5% of standard.

Construction:
24-hour PM_{10} concentration potentially as large as 90% of standard. Concentrations of other criteria pollutants all below 20% of respective standards.

Operations:
8-hour CO concentration potentially as large as 5% of standard.

Construction:
24-hour PM_{10} concentration potentially as large as 25% of standard. Concentrations of other criteria pollutants all below 10% of respective standards.

Operations:
Concentrations of all criteria pollutants below 0.06% of respective standards.

Water

Construction:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable standards

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts to surface water and groundwater; concentrations less than applicable standards

Construction:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable standards

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts to surface water and groundwater; concentrations less than applicable standards

Construction:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable standards

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts to surface water and groundwater; concentrations less than applicable standards

Construction:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable standards

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts to surface water and groundwater; concentrations less than applicable standards

Soil

Construction:
None to negligible impacts

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable guidelines

Construction:
None to negligible impacts

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable guidelines

Construction:
None to negligible impacts

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable guidelines

Construction:
None to negligible impacts

Operations:
None to negligible physical impacts; concentrations less than applicable guidelines

TABLE F.2 (Cont.)

Impacts from Conversion to U_3O_8	Impacts from Conversion to UO_2	Impacts from Conversion to Metal	Impacts from Cylinder Treatment[a]
Socioeconomics			
Construction: Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates, vacant housing, and public finances	**Construction:** Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates and to public finances; potential moderate impacts to vacant housing	**Construction:** Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates, vacant housing, and public finances.	**Construction:** Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates, vacant housing, and public finances.
Operations: Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates, vacant housing, and public finances	**Operations:** Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates and to public finances; potential moderate impacts to vacant housing	**Operations:** Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates, vacant housing, and public finances.	**Operations:** Negligible to low impacts to ROI employment and population growth rates, vacant housing, and public finances.
Ecology			
Construction: Potential moderate impacts to vegetation and wildlife	**Construction:** Potential moderate impacts to vegetation and wildlife	**Construction:** Potential moderate impacts to vegetation and wildlife	**Construction:** Potential moderate impacts to vegetation and wildlife
Operations: Negligible impacts	**Operations:** Negligible impacts	**Operations:** Negligible impacts	**Operations:** Negligible impacts
Waste Management			
Potential moderate impacts to site, regional, or national waste management operations	Potential moderate impacts to site, regional, or national waste management operations	Potential moderate impacts to site, regional, or national waste management operations	Potential moderate impacts to national waste management operations

TABLE F.2 (Cont.)

Impacts from Conversion to U_3O_8	Impacts from Conversion to UO_2	Impacts from Conversion to Metal	Impacts from Cylinder Treatment[a]

Resource Requirements

No impacts from resource requirements (such as electricity or materials) on the local or national scale	No impacts from resource requirements (such as electricity or materials) on the local or national scale	No impacts from resource requirements (such as electricity or materials) on the local or national scale	No impacts from resource requirements (such as electricity or materials) on the local or national scale

Land Use[b]

Construction: Use of approximately 20 acres; negligible impacts	**Construction:** Use of approximately 22 to 31 acres; negligible impacts	**Construction:** Use of approximately 23 to 26 acres; negligible impacts	**Construction:** Use of approximately 9 acres; negligible impacts
Operations: Use of approximately 13 acres; negligible impacts	**Operations:** Use of approximately 14 to 20 acres; negligible impacts	**Operations:** Use of approximately 15 to 16 acres; negligible impacts	**Operations:** Use of approximately 5 acres; negligible impacts

[a] These impacts must be added to those for each of the conversion options.

[b] Land-use acreages given as maximum for a single site or facility. Conversion facilities would also need to establish protective action distances encompassing about 960 acres around the facility.

Notation: CO = carbon monoxide; LCF = latent cancer fatality; MEI = maximally exposed individual; PM_{10} = particulate matter with a mean diameter of 10 µm or less; ROI = region of influence.

TABLE F.3 Summary of Technologies Considered under Each Conversion Option

Conversion Option	Technologies
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	- Defluorination with anhydrous HF production
	- Defluorination with HF neutralization
Conversion to UO$_2$	- Dry process with anhydrous HF production
	- Dry process with HF neutralization
	- Gelation process
Conversion to metal	- Batch metallothermic reduction
	- Continuous metallothermic reduction

Following removal of the depleted UF$_6$, the emptied cylinders containing "heels" would be stored for about 3 months to allow the level of radioactivity associated with the decay products of uranium that remained after UF$_6$ withdrawal to decrease to acceptable levels. Subsequently, in the proposed cylinder treatment facility, the emptied cylinders are first washed with water and the resulting aqueous wash solution is evaporated and converted to solid U$_3$O$_8$ and hydrogen fluoride (HF). The U$_3$O$_8$ would be packaged and sent either for disposal or storage. The HF would be neutralized to calcium fluoride (CaF$_2$) and separately packaged for disposal or sale.

It was assumed that the treated cylinders with a very low residual radiation level would become part of the DOE scrap metal inventory. A report by Nieves et al. (1997) analyzed the potential health and cost impacts associated with various options for the empty cylinders after treatment, including recycle into low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal containers, reuse as LLW containers, free release for remelting, and disposal (i.e., burial) as LLW. Health endpoints assessed included chemical risks, radiation risks, and trauma risks. The estimated total health risks over 20 years of processing ranged from 0.1 to 0.8 total fatality for the various options. The potential health impacts were similar for each of the options; however, the disposal option was considered to have the greatest adverse environmental impacts because it would require land allocations and removal of the metal mass from any further usefulness.

F.2.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

A "dry" process, referred to as defluorination, is well established and currently used by industry. It is also practiced on a large-scale industrial basis by Cogema in France. In this process, UF$_6$ is chemically decomposed with steam and heat to produce U$_3$O$_8$ and concentrated HF. The U$_3$O$_8$ would then be compacted to achieve a bulk density of about 3 g/cm^3 prior to storage or disposal.

Two technologies were considered for management of the HF following conversion of UF$_6$ to U$_3$O$_8$. The first process would upgrade the concentrated HF to anhydrous HF for sale. Anhydrous HF is a valuable product; one potential use for HF is in the production of UF$_6$ from natural uranium ore for feedstock to the gaseous diffusion process. The second process would neutralize the HF to CaF$_2$ for disposal or sale, depending on whether the CaF$_2$ with trace amounts of uranium could be marketed.

Because of the considerable market for anhydrous HF, the technology of defluorination with anhydrous HF production would minimize waste and increase product value. However, the handling, storage, and transportation of large quantities of anhydrous HF pose a potential hazard to both workers and the public. During the conversion process, the HF would be upgraded to anhydrous HF by distillation, a common industrial process. Based on historical experience, it is anticipated that the anhydrous HF would contain only trace amounts of depleted uranium (less than 1 ppm, or 0.4 pCi/g) (LLNL 1997). Thus, it was assumed that the anhydrous HF could be sold commercially for unrestricted use.

The process of HF neutralization with lime would convert the concentrated HF to CaF$_2$ for disposal or possible sale. This step would avoid the potential hazards associated with the processing, general handling, storage, and transportation of large quantities of anhydrous HF. However, the value of CaF$_2$ is significantly less than that of anhydrous HF, and large quantities of lime are required for neutralization, which would add to the cost of the neutralization option. It is also unknown whether the CaF$_2$ produced would be sold, disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, or disposed of as LLW. If disposal were required, there could be moderate impacts to waste management (see Section F.3.7).

F.2.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

The conversion of UF$_6$ to UO$_2$ is used in the nuclear fuel fabrication industry. The UF$_6$ is converted to a low-density UO$_2$ powder by either a "wet" or "dry" process. "Wet" processes are based upon separation of solid UO$_2$ from an aqueous solution, whereas "dry" processes are based upon decomposing and reducing the UF$_6$. The resulting powder is pressed into a pellet under high pressure, and the pellet is sintered (agglomerated) at high temperatures to yield a dense solid. Depending on the shape, size, and size distribution, the bulk density of UO$_2$ will generally be 6 to 9 g/cm^3.

Three technologies were considered for the conversion of UF$_6$ to UO$_2$. A generic industrial dry process with conversion to produce centimeter-sized pellets is the basis for the first two technologies. The first process would upgrade the concentrated HF to anhydrous HF for sale, similar to the U$_3$O$_8$ process. The second process would neutralize the HF to CaF$_2$ for disposal or sale. The third process is a "wet" process, based on pilot-scale studies, and is referred to as the gelation process.

In the dry process, gaseous UF$_6$ would be chemically reacted with steam to produce solid uranyl fluoride (UO$_2$F$_2$) and HF. The UO$_2$F$_2$ would then be converted to UO$_2$ powder through a combination of chemical reactions. Using standard physical treatment operations (milling, compacting, and screening) and the addition of a dry lubricant, the UO$_2$ powder would be pressed into dense pellets with a bulk density of about 6 g/cm^3. The HF would be upgraded to anhydrous HF for commercial resale, as described in Section F.2.1. In the other dry process, the HF would be neutralized to CaF$_2$ rather than upgraded to anhydrous HF.

In the gelation process, small, dense spheres of UO$_2$ would be produced through a combination of chemical processes beginning with the conversion of UF$_6$ to UO$_2$F$_2$ and anhydrous HF. The solid UO$_2$F$_2$ would then be reacted with steam to produce U$_3$O$_8$ and additional anhydrous HF. The U$_3$O$_8$ would be dissolved in nitric acid, mixed with other chemicals, and chilled to form a feed broth. This broth would be formed into droplets and fed into a column of hot chlorinated hydrocarbon liquid. Once these droplets formed into spheres, they would be removed from the hot liquid and washed. The droplets would then be dried and converted by heating to dense uranium oxide. The final sintered uranium dioxide spheres are expected to have a density of about 95% or greater of the theoretical maximum density of uranium dioxide, resulting in a bulk density of about 9 g/cm^3. The gelation process has not been demonstrated on a commercial scale.

F.2.3 Conversion to Metal

The conversion of UF$_6$ to uranium metal would use a commercial process called metallothermic reduction. During this process, UF$_6$ would react with both hydrogen and magnesium metal to produce uranium metal, anhydrous HF, and magnesium fluoride (MgFl$_2$; slag). Two technologies were considered: a batch reduction process, which is the method used to date, and a continuous reduction process, which is under development and has not been demonstrated on a commercial scale.

In the batch metallothermic reduction process, the UF$_6$ would be mixed with hydrogen gas in a vertical reaction vessel to form uranium tetrafluoride (UF$_4$) and HF. The anhydrous HF would be recovered and stored for sale. The UF$_4$ powder and an excess of magnesium would be contained in a sealed metal vessel and preheated. Once initiated, the reaction would produce molten uranium metal (collecting at the bottom of the reactor) and less dense molten MgF$_2$ slag. The cycle time per batch (about 12 hours total) would be dominated by the heating and cooling periods. A large number of reactors would be required because of the long cycle time. The slag would be ground, screened, and prepared for disposal. Any metal pellets would be recovered for recycle.

In the continuous metallothermic reduction process, the UF$_6$ would be mixed with hydrogen gas in a vertical reaction vessel to form UF$_4$ and HF. The anhydrous HF would be recovered and stored for sale. A mixture of UF$_4$, magnesium (Mg), iron (Fe), and salt would be continuously fed into the top of a heated reactor. The more dense molten uranium/iron compound would settle to the bottom of the reactor where it would be continuously withdrawn. The lower density MgF$_2$/salt

mixture would float on top and be separately withdrawn. The molten uranium/iron compound would then be cast into ingots or the end-product form if the manufacturing function was integrated into the conversion facility. The molten salt mixture would be cooled and ground and the water-soluble salt dissolved. After evaporation and drying, the salt would be recycled to the reactor. The insoluble MgF$_2$ would be drummed for disposal. The annual throughput of the continuous metallothermic reduction reactor would be greater than a batch reactor, requiring fewer reactors.

Neutralization of HF to CaF$_2$ was not explicitly analyzed in the engineering analysis report for the conversion to metal options (LLNL 1997). However, the process could be implemented and would produce approximately one-third as much CaF$_2$ as would be produced under the conversion to oxide with neutralization options.

F.2.4 Conversion Technologies and Chemical Forms Considered But Not Analyzed in Detail

The conversion technologies analyzed in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997) and the PEIS are those with a sufficient technical basis to carry out preconceptual designs. A number of other promising conversion technologies were considered, but, with minor exceptions, these are in the early stages of conceptualization or development. These options are also discussed in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997).

For conversion to an oxide form, technologies considered but not analyzed in detail include a molten metal catalyzed process; the Cameco process (patent pending), which uses a different chemical process than steam hydrolysis/pyrolysis; a conversion process that produces a by-product of aluminum trifluoride (AlF$_3$); and a defluorination process that results in the production of hydrofluorocarbons. For conversion to metal, a plasma dissociation process was considered but not analyzed in detail.

F.3 IMPACTS OF OPTIONS

This section provides a summary of the potential environmental impacts associated with the conversion options, including impacts from construction and facility operations. For each area of impact, a description of the assessment methodology (including models) is provided in Appendix C.

The environmental impacts from the conversion options were evaluated based on the information described in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997). The following general assumptions apply to all conversion facility operations:

- All facility designs were based on a single conversion plant sized to process the entire inventory of DOE-generated depleted UF$_6$ cylinders over a 20-year period (approximately 2,300 cylinders per year).

- The conversion plant was assumed to operate 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 52 weeks per year, with 20% down-time.

- A "stand-alone" cylinder treatment facility (for empty cylinders) is collocated with the conversion plant.

The location of a conversion facility at one of the three current storage sites, if required at all, would not be decided until some time in the future. Instead, for each conversion option, the environmental impacts were calculated separately for a single hypothetical facility located at each of the three current depleted UF$_6$ storage sites. The three current storage sites were used to provide a reasonable range of environmental conditions. A more detailed assessment of site considerations would be addressed, as appropriate, as part of the second phase (tier) of the programmatic NEPA approach.

For each conversion option, the potential environmental impacts are presented as a range within each area of impact. This range is intended to provide a reasonable estimate of the magnitude of impacts, taking into account the uncertainty relative to the specific technologies and sites that would ultimately be selected for conversion. The range of impacts results from two factors: (1) fundamental differences among the technologies within each conversion option and (2) differences in the site conditions.

F.3.1 Human Health — Normal Operations

F.3.1.1 Radiological Impacts

Radiological impacts to involved workers during normal operations at conversion facilities would result primarily from external radiation from the handling of depleted uranium materials. Impacts to noninvolved workers and members of the public would result primarily from trace amounts of uranium compounds released to the environment. Detailed discussions of the methodologies used in radiological impact analysis are provided in Appendix C and in Cheng et al. (1997).

F.3.1.1.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ would result in average radiation exposure of about 300 mrem/yr to involved workers and less than 0.01 mrem/yr to noninvolved workers and members of the public. Radiation doses and cancer risks associated with normal operations of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facilities are listed in Tables F.4 and F.5, respectively. The two conversion technologies evaluated are described in Section F.2.1. Due to the similarity of the conversion processes, the airborne emission rates of uranium compounds and the material handling activities are expected to vary only slightly from each other, resulting in similar radiological impacts.

Involved Workers. Radiation exposures for the involved workers are estimated according to the descriptions of material handling activities provided in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997). Due to the preliminary nature of each facility design, the estimated radiation doses are subject to a large degree of uncertainty. The results presented in this appendix should be used only for purposes of comparison among different technologies. Radiation exposure of involved workers would be monitored by a dosimetry program and maintained below regulatory limits.

The collective dose for involved workers is estimated to be about 41 person-rem/yr for 135 workers for the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion processes. This would result in about 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) per year (or about 2 LCFs over a 100-year period) among the involved workers. If evenly distributed among involved workers, the average individual dose would be approximately 300 mrem/yr, well below the regulatory limit of 5,000 mrem/yr for workers (10 *Code of Federal Regulations* [CFR] Part 835). This corresponds to an average cancer risk of about 1×10^{-4} per year (1 chance in 10,000 of developing 1 LCF per year).

Noninvolved Workers. Estimated doses and health risks are much lower for noninvolved workers than for involved workers. Inhalation of U$_3$O$_8$ particulates accounts for more than 99.9% of the radiological exposures for noninvolved workers. The radiation dose (risk of an LCF) to a maximally exposed noninvolved worker would range from 1.6×10^{-3} mrem/yr (6×10^{-10} per year) to 5.8×10^{-3} mrem/yr (2×10^{-9} per year), which is a very small fraction (less than 1 in 1,000) of the maximally allowable dose limit (10 mrem/yr) from airborne emissions (40 CFR Part 61). The population of noninvolved workers would vary from site to site. For representative noninvolved worker population sizes ranging from 2,000 to 3,500, the resulting collective dose would range from 0.0021 to 0.0045 person-rem/yr.

General Public. The locations of the maximally exposed individual (MEI) for the general public are either at or near the site boundary. Although other exposure pathways are also considered, inhalation exposure accounts for more than 95% of the total dose. The radiation dose for the MEI would be negligible, ranging from 0.0049 to 0.0088 mrem/yr, compared with the dose limit of 10 mrem/yr from airborne emissions. The potential radiation dose resulting from drinking

TABLE F.4 Radiological Doses from Conversion/Treatment Options under Normal Operations[a]

| | Dose to Receptor | | | | | |
| | Involved Workers[b] | | Noninvolved Workers[c] | | General Public | |
Option	Average Dose (mrem/yr)	Collective Dose (person-rem/yr)	MEI Dose[d] (mrem/yr)	Collective Dose (person-rem/yr)	MEI Dose[e] (mrem/yr)	Collective Dose[f] (person-rem/yr)
Conversion to U_3O_8	300	41	$1.6 \times 10^{-3} - 5.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-3} - 4.5 \times 10^{-3}$	$4.9 \times 10^{-3} - 8.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.9 \times 10^{-2} - 1.4 \times 10^{-1}$
Conversion to UO_2	180 – 340	49 – 54	$3.2 \times 10^{-3} - 2.2 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-3} - 1.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$9.7 \times 10^{-3} - 3.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$7.8 \times 10^{-2} - 5.1 \times 10^{-1}$
Conversion to metal	230 – 240	33 – 67	$6.8 \times 10^{-4} - 1.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$9.0 \times 10^{-4} - 1.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-3} - 2.6 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-2} - 4.0 \times 10^{-1}$
Cylinder treatment	160	16	$4.9 \times 10^{-6} - 1.8 \times 10^{-5}$	$6.5 \times 10^{-6} - 1.4 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-5} - 2.7 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-4} - 4.1 \times 10^{-4}$

[a] Impacts are reported as ranges, which result from variations in the three representative facility locations and the different conversion technologies within each option.

[b] Involved workers are those workers directly involved with the handling of radioactive materials. Calculation results are presented as average individual dose and collective dose for the worker population. Radiation doses to individual workers would be monitored by a dosimetry program and maintained below applicable standards, such as the DOE administrative control limit of 2,000 mrem/yr.

[c] Noninvolved workers include individuals who work at the facility but are not directly involved in handling materials and individuals who work on-site but not within the facility. The population size of noninvolved workers ranges from 2,000 to 3,500 for all options.

[d] The MEI for the noninvolved workers was assumed to be located on-site 100 m or more from the release point at the location that would result in the largest dose, which includes doses from inhalation, external radiation, and incidental soil ingestion.

[e] The MEI for the general public was assumed to be located off-site at the point that would result in the largest dose from exposures through inhalation, external radiation, and ingestion of plant foods, meat, milk, soil, and drinking water.

[f] Collective dose was estimated for the populations (ranging from 500,000 to 880,000 persons) within a radius of 50 miles (80 km) around the three representative sites. The exposure pathways considered are inhalation, external radiation, and ingestion of plant foods, meat, milk, and soil.

TABLE F.5 Latent Cancer Risks from Conversion/Treatment Options under Normal Operations[a]

	Involved Workers[b]		Noninvolved Workers[c]		General Public	
Option	Average Risk (risk/yr)	Collective Risk (fatalities/yr)	MEI Risk[d] (risk/yr)	Collective Risk (fatalities/yr)	MEI Risk[e] (risk/yr)	Collective Risk[f] (fatalities/yr)
Conversion to U_3O_8	1×10^{-4}	2×10^{-2}	$6 \times 10^{-10} - 2 \times 10^{-9}$	$9 \times 10^{-7} - 2 \times 10^{-6}$	$2 \times 10^{-9} - 4 \times 10^{-9}$	$2 \times 10^{-5} - 7 \times 10^{-5}$
Conversion to UO_2	$7 \times 10^{-5} - 1 \times 10^{-4}$	2×10^{-2}	$1 \times 10^{-9} - 9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2 \times 10^{-6} - 7 \times 10^{-6}$	$5 \times 10^{-9} - 2 \times 10^{-8}$	$4 \times 10^{-5} - 3 \times 10^{-4}$
Conversion to metal	$9 \times 10^{-5} - 1 \times 10^{-4}$	$1 \times 10^{-2} - 3 \times 10^{-2}$	$3 \times 10^{-10} - 7 \times 10^{-9}$	$4 \times 10^{-7} - 5 \times 10^{-6}$	$1 \times 10^{-9} - 1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9 \times 10^{-6} - 2 \times 10^{-4}$
Cylinder treatment	6×10^{-5}	6×10^{-3}	$2 \times 10^{-12} - 7 \times 10^{-12}$	$3 \times 10^{-9} - 5 \times 10^{-9}$	$8 \times 10^{-12} - 1 \times 10^{-11}$	$6 \times 10^{-8} - 2 \times 10^{-7}$

[a] Impacts are reported as ranges, which result from variations in the three representative facility locations and the different conversion technologies within each option.

[b] Involved workers are those workers directly involved with the handling of radioactive materials. Calculation results are presented as average individual risk and collective risk for the worker population.

[c] Noninvolved workers include individuals who work at the facility but are not directly involved in handling materials and individuals who work on-site but not within the facility. The population size of noninvolved workers ranges from 2,000 to 3,500 for all options.

[d] The MEI for the noninvolved workers was assumed to be located on-site 100 m or more from the release point at the location that would result in the largest risk, which includes risks from inhalation, external radiation, and incidental soil ingestion.

[e] The MEI for the general public was assumed to be located off-site at the point that would result in the largest risk from exposures through inhalation, external radiation, and ingestion of plant foods, meat, milk, soil, and drinking water.

[f] Collective risk was estimated for the populations (ranging from 500,000 to 880,000 persons) within a radius of 50 miles (80 km) around the three representative sites. The exposure pathways considered are inhalation, external radiation, and ingestion of plant foods, meat, milk, and soil.

contaminated surface water would be two orders of magnitude less than that from exposure to airborne emissions.

For a location with an off-site population ranging from 500,000 to 880,000 persons within a 50-mile (80-km) distance from the site boundary, the collective dose would range from 0.039 to 0.14 person-rem/yr, which corresponds to about 2×10^{-5} to 7×10^{-5} LCF per year (less than 1 chance in 10,000 of 1 LCF per year in the population).

F.3.1.1.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

Conversion to UO$_2$ would result in average radiation exposure of less than 340 mrem/yr to involved workers and less than 0.04 mrem/yr to noninvolved workers and members of the public, similar to those for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. The radiation doses and cancer risks associated with normal operations of the UO$_2$ conversion facilities are listed in Tables F.4 and F.5, respectively.

Involved Workers. The estimated collective dose for involved workers ranges from 49 to 54 person-rem/yr, slightly greater than conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. This would result in approximately 0.02 excess cancer fatality per year (2 LCFs over a 100-year period). If evenly distributed among involved workers (about 160 to 270 workers), the average individual dose would range from about 180 to 340 mrem/yr, well below the annual worker dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr. This corresponds to an average cancer risk of 7×10^{-5} to 1×10^{-4} per year (less than 1 chance in 10,000 of developing 1 LCF per year).

Noninvolved Workers. The doses to noninvolved workers are similar to but slightly higher than those for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. The dose to the MEI would range from 0.0032 to 0.022 mrem/yr, which is negligible compared with the dose limit of 10 mrem/yr for airborne emissions. For representative population sizes ranging from 2,000 to 3,500, the collective dose would range from 0.0042 to 0.017 person-rem/yr. The estimated number of potential LCFs would be less than 0.00001 per year.

General Public. The estimated radiation dose to the MEI for the general public would be slightly higher than that from conversion to U$_3$O$_8$, ranging from 0.0097 to 0.033 mrem/yr. These values are well below the radiation dose limit of 10 mrem/yr set for airborne emissions. The radiation dose from drinking contaminated surface water would be very small compared with the dose from airborne emissions. The collective dose for a population of 500,000 to 880,000 persons would range from 0.078 to 0.51 person-rem/yr. This would correspond to 4×10^{-5} to 3×10^{-4} LCF per year among the population (less than 1 chance in 3,000 of 1 LCF per year).

F.3.1.1.3 Conversion to Metal

Conversion to uranium metal would result in average exposure of less than 240 mrem/yr to involved workers and less than 0.03 mrem/yr to noninvolved workers and members of the public. The radiological impacts and cancer risks from operations of the metal conversion facilities are shown in Tables F.4 and F.5, respectively.

Involved Workers. The collective dose to involved workers would range from 33 to 67 person-rem/yr, similar to conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ and conversion to UO$_2$. The corresponding number of LCFs would range from 0.01 to 0.03 per year (1 to 3 LCFs over a 100-year period) among a worker population of approximately 140 to 270. If evenly distributed among workers, the average annual worker dose would be about 240 mrem/yr, which is well below the regulatory limit of 5,000 mrem/yr. The corresponding cancer risk is 0.0001 per year (less than 1 chance in 10,000 of developing 1 LCF per year).

Noninvolved Workers. The radiation dose to noninvolved workers would be similar to those for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ and conversion to UO$_2$ and would be negligible compared with the regulatory dose limit of 10 mrem/yr. The collective dose would range from 0.0009 to 0.013 person-rem/yr for 2,000 to 3,500 workers.

General Public. The radiation dose for the MEI of the general public would range from 0.0021 to 0.026 mrem/yr, which corresponds to a cancer risk of 1×10^{-9} to 1×10^{-8} per year (less than 1 chance in 100 million of developing 1 LCF per year). The radiation dose from drinking contaminated surface water would be very small compared with the dose from airborne emissions. The collective dose for the population of 500,000 to 880,000 people living within 50 miles (80 km) of the site would range from 0.017 to 0.4 person-rem/yr. This corresponds to about 9×10^{-6} to 2×10^{-4} LCF per year within the exposed population.

F.3.1.1.4 Cylinder Treatment Facility

The empty UF$_6$ cylinders from the conversion facilities would be decontaminated at a cylinder treatment facility before reuse or final disposal. Average radiological exposure incurred by involved workers would be less than 200 mrem/yr, and maximum exposures incurred by noninvolved workers and the off-site public would be less than 3×10^{-5} mrem/yr. The estimated radiological impacts and cancer risks from cylinder treatment operations are presented in Tables F.4 and F.5, respectively.

Involved Workers. The average annual dose received by involved workers would be approximately 160 mrem/yr, which was calculated by evenly distributing the estimated collective dose of 16 person-rem/yr to a worker population of approximately 100. The average dose is a small fraction of the dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr and corresponds to a cancer risk of 6×10^{-5} per year (1 chance in 16,000 of developing 1 LCF per year). The collective number of LCFs among the involved workers would be 6×10^{-3} per year.

Noninvolved Workers. Only a small amount of U_3O_8 (0.01 lb/yr) would be released to the atmosphere from the cylinder treatment facility. Radiological exposure to the noninvolved worker MEI would be negligible (less than 1.8×10^{-5} mrem/yr). The collective dose would range from 6.5×10^{-6} to 1.4×10^{-5} person-rem/yr for a population of 2,000 to 3,500.

General Public. The radiation exposure of the general public MEI from normal operations at the treatment facility would be negligible (less than 2.7×10^{-5} mrem/yr). The collective dose to the off-site population of 500,000 to 880,000 people would be less than 4.1×10^{-4} person-rem/yr.

F.3.1.2 Chemical Impacts

Potential chemical impacts to human health from normal operations at the conversion facilities would result primarily from exposure to trace amounts of insoluble uranium compounds (i.e., UO_2, U_3O_8, and UF_4) and HF released from process exhaust stacks. Risks from normal operations were quantified on the basis of calculated hazard indices. Information on the exposure assumptions, health effects assumptions, reference doses used for uranium compounds and HF, and calculational methods used in the chemical impact analysis are provided in Appendix C and Cheng et al. (1997).

Conversion to U_3O_8, UO_2, or metal would result in very low-level exposures to hazardous chemicals. No adverse health effects would be expected during normal operations. Hazardous chemical human health impacts resulting from normal operations of the conversion facilities are summarized in Table F.6. The hazard indices for all conversion processes are more than 5,000 times lower than the hazard index of 1, which is the level at which adverse health effects might be expected to occur in some exposed individuals. The range of chemical exposures to the noninvolved workers and general public results primarily from the assumed locations of the representative conversion facilities.

One of the UO_2 conversion options, the gelation process, would also generate emissions of the chemical trichloroethylene from the process stack. The estimated increased lifetime carcinogenic risk of cancer incidence for noninvolved workers and members of the general public from exposure to trichloroethylene would be less than 1×10^{-8}, a very small increased risk that would not be considered an adverse impact.

TABLE F.6 Chemical Impacts to Human Health for Conversion/Treatment Options under Normal Operations[a]

| | Impacts to Receptor | | | |
| | Noninvolved Workers[b] | | General Public | |
Option	Hazard Index for MEI[c,d]	Population Risk[e] (persons at risk/yr)	Hazard Index for MEI[c,f]	Population Risk[e] (persons at risk/yr)
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	3.9×10^{-7} – 1.5×10^{-6}	–	3.4×10^{-5} – 1.2×10^{-4}	–
Conversion to UO$_2$	7.5×10^{-7} – 3.1×10^{-6}	–	6.2×10^{-5} – 1.9×10^{-4}	–
Conversion to metal	4.8×10^{-7} – 3.0×10^{-6}	–	4.1×10^{-5} – 1.5×10^{-4}	–
Cylinder treatment	4.2×10^{-10} – 1.5×10^{-9}	–	3.5×10^{-8} – 7.1×10^{-8}	–

[a] Impacts are reported as ranges, which result from variations in the three representative facility locations and the different conversion technologies within each option.

[b] Noninvolved workers include individuals who work at the facility but are not directly involved in handling hazardous materials and individuals who work on-site but not within the facility.

[c] The hazard index is an indicator for potential adverse health effects other than cancer; a hazard index greater than 1 indicates a potential for adverse health effects and a need for further evaluation. Hazard indices were calculated for combined exposures to uranium compounds and HF.

[d] The MEI for the noninvolved workers was assumed to be located on-site 100 m or more from the release point at the location that would result in the largest exposure from airborne emissions, including inhalation and incidental ingestion of contaminated soil.

[e] Calculation of population risk is not applicable when the corresponding hazard index for the MEI is less than 1.

[f] The MEI for the general public was assumed to be located off-site at the location that would result in the largest exposures through inhalation and ingestion of soil and drinking water.

The empty UF$_6$ cylinders from the conversion facilities would be decontaminated at a cylinder treatment facility prior to final disposal. Estimates of the hazardous chemical impacts to human health resulting from cylinder treatment operations are also summarized in Table F.6. The hazard indices from the cylinder treatment facility would be hundreds of times lower than those predicted for the conversion options, for which no adverse human health impacts were predicted.

F.3.2 Human Health — Accident Conditions

A range of accidents covering the spectrum from high-frequency/low-consequence accidents to low-frequency/high-consequence accidents has been presented in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997). These accidents are listed in Table F.7. The following sections present the results for radiological and chemical health impacts of the highest-consequence accident in each frequency category. Results for all accidents listed in Table F.7 are presented in Policastro et al. (1997). A detailed description of the methodology and assumptions used in the calculations is also provided in Appendix C and Policastro et al. (1997).

F.3.2.1 Radiological Impacts

Table F.8 lists the radiological doses to various receptors for the accidents that give the highest dose from each frequency category. The LCF risks for these accidents are given in Table F.9. The doses and the risks are presented as ranges (maximum and minimum) because two different meteorological conditions, three representative sites, and two or three technologies were considered for each conversion option (see Appendix C). The doses and risks presented here were obtained by assuming that the accidents would occur. The probability of occurrence for each accident is indicated by the frequency category to which it belongs. For example, accidents in the extremely unlikely category have a probability of occurrence of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1 million per year. The following conclusions may be drawn from the radiological health impact results:

- No cancer fatalities would be predicted from any of the accidents.

- The maximum radiological dose to noninvolved worker and general public MEIs (assuming that an accident occurred) would be 9.2 rem. This dose is less than the 25-rem dose recommended for assessing the adequacy of protection of public health and safety from potential accidents by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC 1994).

- The overall radiological risk to noninvolved worker and general public MEI receptors (estimated by multiplying the risk per occurrence [Table F.9] by the annual probability of occurrence by the number of years of operations) would be less than 1 for all of the conversion facility accidents.

F.3.2.2 Chemical Impacts

The accidents considered in this section are listed in Table F.7. The results of the accident consequence modeling in terms of chemical impacts are presented in Tables F.10 and F.11. The results are presented as (1) number of people with potential for adverse effects and (2) number of

TABLE F.7 Accidents Considered for the Conversion Options

Option/Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$					
Likely Accidents (frequency: 1 or more times in 100 years)					
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area on the dry ground.	UF$_6$	24	60 (continuous)	Ground
Cylinder valve shear	A single UF$_6$ cylinder is mishandled, etc., resulting in the shearing of the cylinder valve and loss of solid UF$_6$ from the valve onto the ground.	UF$_6$	0.25	120 (continuous)	Ground
HF system leak during upgrading of HF to anhydrous HF	An HF absorber column line leaks 5% of its flowing contents due to potential vessel, pump, or pipe leakage.	HF	216	15	Stack
HF system leak during HF neutralization	An HF distillation column line leaks 5% of its flowing contents due to potential vessel, pump, or pipe leakage.	HF	10	15	Stack
Loss of cooling water during upgrading of HF to anhydrous HF	Cooling water is lost to the HF distillation column condenser, and HF vapor is removed by a limestone bed before reaching the environment.	HF	22	2	Stack
Loss of cooling water during HF neutralization	Cooling water is lost to the absorption column coolers, and HF vapor is released to the atmosphere.	HF	19	2	Stack
Loss of off-site electrical power	Off-site electrical power is lost, which halts facility operations but does not result in significant releases to the environment.	No release	NA[b]	NA	NA
U$_3$O$_8$ drum spill	A single U$_3$O$_8$ drum is damaged by a forklift and spills its contents onto the floor inside the storage facility.	U$_3$O$_8$	0.00014	30	Stack
Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 100 years to 1 in 10,000 years)					
Ammonia release	An ammonia fill line is momentarily disconnected, and ammonia is released at grade.	Ammonia	255	1	Ground
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area on the wet ground.	HF	96	60 (continuous)	Ground
HF pipeline rupture	An earthquake ruptures an underground pipeline transporting HFs, releasing it to the ground.	HF	500	10	Soil
HF storage tank overflow	An HF storage tank overflows during filling, spilling onto the floor; the pool of HF evaporates and is released through the building stack.	HF	45	15	Stack

TABLE F.7 (Cont.)

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ (Cont.)					
Extremely Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years)					
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area into a 0.25-in.-deep water pool.	HF	150	60 (continuous)	Ground
Earthquake	The U$_3$O$_8$ storage building is damaged during a design-basis earthquake, and 10% of the stored drums are breached.	U$_3$O$_8$	41	30	Ground
Hydrogen explosion	Due to equipment malfunction, hydrogen that accumulated in the conversion reactor ignites and causes the reactor to rupture.	U$_3$O$_8$ HF	0.27 7	30	Stack
Tornado	A windblown missile from a design-basis tornado pierces a single U$_3$O$_8$ drum in the U$_3$O$_8$ storage building.	U$_3$O$_8$	69	0.5	Ground
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	Three full 48G UF$_6$ cylinders hydraulically rupture during a fire resulting from the ignition of fuel and/or hydraulic fluid from the transport vehicle, etc.	UF$_6$	0 11,500 8,930 3,580	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground
Incredible Accidents (frequency: less than 1 in 1 million years)					
Anhydrous HF tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled anhydrous HF storage tank.	HF	7,920	120	Ground
Ammonia tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled ammonia storage tank.	Ammonia	118,000	20	Ground
Flood	The facility would be located at a site that would preclude severe flooding.	No release	NA	NA	NA
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	A small plane crash affects two full 48G UF$_6$ cylinders. One cylinder hydraulically ruptures during a fire resulting from the ignition of aviation fuel.	UF$_6$	0 3,840 2,980 1,190	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground
	The second cylinder is initially breached due to impact with aircraft debris, followed by sublimation due to fire.	UF$_6$	4,240 1,190	0 to 30 30 to 121	Ground

TABLE F.7 (Cont.)

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to UO$_2$					
Likely Accidents (frequency: 1 or more times in 100 years)					
Ammonia stripper overpressure	Cooling water is lost to the ammonia stripping column, and ammonia vapor is released to the atmosphere.	Ammonia	15	1	Ground
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area on the dry ground.	UF$_6$	24	60 (continuous)	Ground
Cylinder valve shear	A single UF$_6$ cylinder is mishandled, etc., resulting in shearing of the cylinder valve and loss of solid UF$_6$ from the valve onto the ground.	UF$_6$	0.25	120 (continuous)	Ground
HF system leak during upgrading of HF to anhydrous HF	An HF absorber line leaks 5% of its flowing contents due to potential vessel, pump, or pipe leakage.	HF	216	15	Stack
HF system leak during HF neutralization	An HF distillation column line leaks 5% of its flowing contents due to potential vessel, pump, or pipe leakage.	HF	10	15	Stack
Loss of cooling water during upgrading of HF to anhydrous HF	Cooling water is lost to the HF distillation column condenser, and HF vapor is removed by a limestone bed before reaching the environment.	HF	22	2	Stack
Loss of cooling water during HF neutralization	Cooling water is lost to the absorption column coolers, and HF vapor is released to the atmosphere.	HF	19	2	Stack
Loss of off-site electrical power	Off-site electrical power is lost, which halts facility operations but does not result in significant releases to the environment.	No release	NA	NA	NA
Trichloroethylene (TCE) spill	A TCE storage tank spills onto the floor during operations, and the pool of TCE evaporates and is released to the environment.	TCE	120	120	Stack
Trichloroethylene vapor leak	The exhaust line from the gel sphere dryers leaks 5% of its flowing contents due to potential pipe leakage.	TCE	20	60	Stack
UO$_2$ drum spill	A single UO$_2$ drum is damaged by a forklift and spills its contents onto the floor inside the storage facility.	UO$_2$	0.000056	30	Stack

TABLE F.7 (Cont.)

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to UO$_2$ (Cont.)					
Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 100 years to 1 in 10,000 years)					
Ammonia release	An ammonia fill line is momentarily disconnected, and ammonia is released at grade.	Ammonia	255	1	Ground
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area on the wet ground.	HF	96	60 (continuous)	Ground
HF pipeline rupture	An earthquake ruptures an underground pipeline transporting HF, releasing it to the ground.	HF	500	10	Soil
HF storage tank overflow	An HF storage tank overflows during filling, spilling onto the floor; the pool of HF evaporates and is released to the indoor air of the process building.	HF	45	15	Stack
Extremely Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years)					
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area into a 0.25-in.-deep water pool.	HF	147	60 (continuous)	Ground
Earthquake	The UO$_2$ storage building is damaged during a design-basis earthquake, and 10% of the stored drums are breached.	UO$_2$	9.8	30	Ground
Hydrogen explosion	Due to equipment malfunction, hydrogen that accumulated in the ceramic UO$_2$ conversion reactor ignites and causes the reactor to rupture.	UO$_2$ HF	0.25 7	30	Stack
Hydrogen explosion	Due to equipment malfunction, hydrogen that accumulated in the gelation conversion reactor ignites and causes the reactor to rupture.	UO$_2$	0.017	30	Stack
Tornado	A windblown missile from a design-basis tornado pierces a single ceramic UO$_2$ drum in the UO$_2$ storage building.	UO$_2$	3.7	0.5	Ground
Tornado	A windblown missile from a design-basis tornado pierces a single UO$_2$ drum produced by gelation in the UO$_2$ storage building.	UO$_2$	5.6	0.5	Ground
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	Three full 48G UF$_6$ cylinders hydraulically rupture during a fire resulting from the ignition of fuel and/or hydraulic fluid from the transport vehicle, etc.	UF$_6$	0 11,500 8,930 3,580	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground

TABLE F.7 (Cont.)

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to UO$_2$ (Cont.)					
Incredible Accidents (frequency: less than 1 in 1 million years)					
Anhydrous HF tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled anhydrous HF storage tank.	HF	7,920	120	Ground
Ammonia tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled ammonia storage tank.	Ammonia	117,920	20	Ground
Flood	The facility would be located at a site that would preclude severe flooding.	No release	NA	NA	NA
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	A small plane crash affects two full 48G UF$_6$ cylinders. One cylinder hydraulically ruptures during a fire resulting from the ignition of aviation fuel.	UF$_6$	0 3,840 2,980 1,190	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground
	The second cylinder is initially breached due to impact with aircraft debris, followed by sublimation due to fire.	UF$_6$	4,240 1,190	0 to 30 30 to 121	Ground
Conversion to Metal					
Likely Accidents (frequency: 1 or more times in 100 years)					
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF$_6$ forming a 4-ft^2 area on the dry ground.	UF$_6$	24	60 (continuous)	Ground
Cylinder valve shear	A single UF$_6$ cylinder is mishandled, etc., resulting in shearing of the cylinder valve and loss of solid UF$_6$ from the valve onto the ground.	UF$_6$	0.25	120 (continuous)	Ground
HF system leak	An off-gas line from the conversion reactor to the condenser leaks 5% of its flowing contents due to potential vessel, pump, or pipe leakage.	HF	3.6	15	Stack
Loss of cooling water	Cooling water is lost to the reactor HF coolers, and HF vapor is released to the atmosphere.	HF	17	2	Stack
Loss of off-site electrical power	Off-site electrical power is lost, which halts facility operations but does not result in significant releases to the environment.	No release	NA	NA	NA
UF$_4$ drum spill	A single UF$_4$ drum is damaged by a forklift and spills its contents onto the floor of the process building.	UF$_4$	0.00015	30	Stack

TABLE F.7 (Cont.)

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to Metal (Cont.)					
Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 100 years to 1 in 10,000 years)					
Ammonia release	An ammonia fill line is momentarily disconnected, and ammonia is released at grade.	Ammonia	255	1	Ground
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF_6 forming a 4-ft² area on the wet ground.	HF	96	60 (continuous)	Ground
HF pipeline rupture	An earthquake ruptures an underground pipeline transporting HF and releasing it to the ground.	HF	500	10	Soil
HF storage tank overflow	An HF storage tank overflows during filling, spilling onto the floor; the pool of HF evaporates and is released to the indoor air of the process building.	HF	45	15	Stack
Nitric acid (HNO_3) release	Due to equipment failure, hot HNO_3 flows through a relief valve.	HNO_3	6	2	Stack
Uranium metal fire	The wooden boxes containing the uranium metal product burn, affecting a total of 34 uranium derbies.	U_3O_8	0.058	30	Stack
Extremely Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years)					
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	A 1-ft hole results during handling, with solid UF_6 forming a 4-ft² area into a 0.25-in.-deep water pool.	HF	147	60 (continuous)	Ground
Earthquake	The uranium product storage building is damaged during a design-basis earthquake, and some of the boxes containing uranium metal are breached.	U_3O_8	0.058	30	Ground
Hydrogen explosion	Due to equipment malfunction, hydrogen that accumulated in the conversion reactor ignites and causes the reactor to rupture.	UF_4 HF	0.05 2	30	Stack
Reactor rupture	A reactor containing molten uranium metal is damaged or breached, releasing hot molten uranium metal as airborne particles.	U_3O_8	0.0026	15	Stack
Tornado	A design-basis tornado does not result in significant releases because uranium is in metal form.	No release	NA	NA	NA
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	Three full 48G UF_6 cylinders hydraulically rupture during a fire resulting from the ignition of fuel and/or hydraulic fluid from the transport vehicle, etc.	UF_6	0 11,500 8,930 3,580	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground

TABLE F.7 (Cont.)

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level[a]
Conversion to Metal (Cont.)					
Incredible Accidents (frequency: less than 1 in 1 million years)					
Anhydrous HF tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled anhydrous HF storage tank.	HF	7,920	120	Ground
Ammonia tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled ammonia storage tank.	Ammonia	118,000	20	Ground
Flood	The facility would be located at a site that would preclude severe flooding.	No release	NA	NA	NA
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	A small plane crash affects two full 48G UF$_6$ cylinders. One cylinder hydraulically ruptures during a fire resulting from the ignition of aviation fuel.	UF$_6$	0 3,840 2,980 1,190	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground
	The second cylinder is initially breached due to impact with aircraft debris, followed by sublimation due to fire.	UF$_6$	4,240 1,190	0 to 30 30 to 121	Ground
Cylinder Treatment Facility					
Likely Accidents (frequency: 1 or more times in 100 years)					
Loss of off-site electrical power	Off-site electrical power is lost, which halts facility operations but does not result in significant releases to the environment.	No release	NA	NA	NA
U$_3$O$_8$ drum spill	A single U$_3$O$_8$ drum is damaged by a forklift and spills its contents onto the ground outside the storage facility.	U$_3$O$_8$	0.138	30	Ground
Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 100 years to 1 in 10,000 years)					
Loss of scrubber water	Water is lost to both HF scrubbers, and HF is released with the off gas.	HF	26	30	Stack
Extremely Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years)					
Depleted UF$_6$ cylinder rupture	A truck crashes into the depleted UF$_6$ heel storage pad, damaging two cylinders; the fuel from the truck ignites and releases all of the depleted UF$_6$.	UO$_2$F$_2$ HF	38.5 10	30	Ground
Earthquake	The solids product building is damaged during a design-basis earthquake, and 50% of the stored drums are breached.	U$_3$O$_8$	1.9	30	Ground
HF aqueous tank rupture	The evaporator tank fails, releasing its entire contents of HF to the floor; the pool of aqueous HF evaporates and is released to the indoor air of the process building.	HF	3.4	60	Stack
Tornado	A windblown missile from a design-basis tornado pierces a single U$_3$O$_8$ drum in the solids product building.	U$_3$O$_8$	69	0.5	Ground
Incredible Accidents (frequency: less than 1 in 1 million years)					
Flood	The facility would be located at a site that would preclude severe flooding.	No release	NA	NA	NA

[a] Ground-level releases were assumed to occur outdoors on concrete pads in the cylinder storage yards. To prevent contaminant migration, cleanup of residuals was assumed to begin immediately after the release was stopped.

[b] NA = not applicable.

TABLE F.8 Estimated Radiological Doses per Accident Occurrence for the Conversion Options

Option/Accident[a]	Frequency Category[b]	Maximum Dose[c]				Minimum Dose[c]			
		Noninvolved Workers		General Public		Noninvolved Workers		General Public	
		MEI (rem)	Population (person-rem)	MEI (rem)	Population (person-rem)	MEI (rem)	Population (person-rem)	MEI (rem)	Population (person-rem)
Conversion to U_3O_8									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	7.7×10^{-2}	7.1	2.3×10^{-3}	3.0×10^{-1}	3.3×10^{-3}	8.1×10^{-2}	7.8×10^{-5}	7.4×10^{-3}
Earthquake	EU	9.2	8.4×10^{2}	2.7×10^{-1}	2.0×10^{1}	3.9×10^{-1}	9.6	9.2×10^{-3}	8.0×10^{-1}
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	I	6.6×10^{-3}	2.5	4.9×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-1}	8.7×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-1}	6.2×10^{-4}	2.5×10^{-2}
Conversion to UO_2									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	7.7×10^{-2}	7.1	2.3×10^{-3}	3.0×10^{-1}	3.3×10^{-3}	8.1×10^{-2}	7.8×10^{-5}	7.4×10^{-3}
Earthquake	EU	2.3	2.1×10^{2}	6.8×10^{-2}	5.1	9.6×10^{-2}	2.4	2.3×10^{-3}	2.0×10^{-1}
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	I	6.6×10^{-3}	2.5	4.9×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-1}	8.7×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-1}	6.2×10^{-4}	2.5×10^{-2}
Conversion to metal									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	7.7×10^{-2}	7.1	2.3×10^{-3}	3.0×10^{-1}	3.3×10^{-3}	8.1×10^{-2}	7.8×10^{-5}	7.4×10^{-3}
Uranium metal fire	U	2.4×10^{-6}	1.2×10^{-3}	2.6×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-2}	4.9×10^{-7}	2.4×10^{-11}	2.0×10^{-6}	1.1×10^{-3}
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	EU	2.0×10^{-2}	7.5	1.5×10^{-2}	5.6×10^{1}	3.7×10^{-3}	5.2×10^{-1}	1.9×10^{-3}	5.2×10^{-1}
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	I	6.6×10^{-3}	2.5	4.9×10^{-3}	2.7×10^{-1}	8.7×10^{-4}	2.2×10^{-1}	6.2×10^{-4}	2.5×10^{-2}
Cylinder treatment									
U_3O_8 drum spill	L	3.1×10^{-2}	2.8	9.2×10^{-4}	6.9×10^{-2}	1.3×10^{-3}	3.2×10^{-2}	3.1×10^{-5}	2.7×10^{-3}
Tornado[d]	EU	4.3×10^{-1}	3.8×10^{1}	1.3×10^{-2}	2.5	4.3×10^{-1}	1.1×10^{1}	1.0×10^{-2}	4.5×10^{-1}

[a] The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one that would result in the highest dose to the general public MEI. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category. Absence of an accident in a certain frequency category indicates that the accident would not result in a release of radioactive material.

[b] Accident frequencies: likely (L), estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ($> 10^{-2}$/yr); unlikely (U), estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations ($10^{-2} – 10^{-4}$/yr); extremely unlikely (EU), estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ($10^{-4} – 10^{-6}$/yr); incredible (I), estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations ($< 10^{-6}$/yr).

[c] Maximum and minimum doses reflect differences in assumed sites, technologies, and meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, maximum doses would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with 1 m/s wind speed, whereas minimum doses would occur under D stability with 4 m/s wind speed.

[d] Meteorological conditions analyzed for the tornado were D stability with 20 m/s wind speed.

TABLE F.9 Estimated Radiological Health Risks per Accident Occurrence for the Conversion Options[a]

Option/Accident[b]	Frequency Category[c]	Maximum Risk[d] (LCFs)				Minimum Risk[d] (LCFs)			
		Noninvolved Workers		General Public		Noninvolved Workers		General Public	
		MEI	Population	MEI	Population	MEI	Population	MEI	Population
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	3×10^{-5}	3×10^{-3}	1×10^{-6}	2×10^{-4}	1×10^{-6}	3×10^{-5}	4×10^{-8}	4×10^{-6}
Earthquake	EU	4×10^{-3}	3×10^{-1}	1×10^{-4}	1×10^{-2}	2×10^{-4}	4×10^{-3}	5×10^{-6}	4×10^{-4}
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	I	3×10^{-6}	1×10^{-3}	2×10^{-6}	1×10^{-4}	3×10^{-7}	9×10^{-5}	3×10^{-7}	1×10^{-5}
Conversion to UO$_2$									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	3×10^{-5}	3×10^{-3}	1×10^{-6}	2×10^{-4}	1×10^{-6}	3×10^{-5}	4×10^{-8}	4×10^{-6}
Earthquake	EU	9×10^{-4}	8×10^{-3}	3×10^{-5}	3×10^{-3}	4×10^{-5}	1×10^{-3}	1×10^{-6}	1×10^{-4}
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	I	3×10^{-6}	1×10^{-3}	2×10^{-6}	1×10^{-4}	3×10^{-7}	9×10^{-5}	3×10^{-7}	1×10^{-5}
Conversion to metal									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	3×10^{-5}	3×10^{-3}	1×10^{-6}	2×10^{-4}	1×10^{-6}	3×10^{-5}	4×10^{-8}	4×10^{-6}
Uranium metal fire	U	1×10^{-9}	5×10^{-7}	1×10^{-9}	1×10^{-5}	2×10^{-10}	1×10^{-14}	1×10^{-9}	6×10^{-7}
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	EU	8×10^{-6}	3×10^{-3}	7×10^{-6}	3×10^{-2}	1×10^{-6}	2×10^{-4}	1×10^{-6}	3×10^{-4}
Small plane crash, 2 full 48G cylinders	I	3×10^{-6}	1×10^{-3}	2×10^{-6}	1×10^{-4}	3×10^{-7}	9×10^{-5}	3×10^{-7}	1×10^{-5}
Cylinder treatment									
U$_3$O$_8$ drum spill	L	1×10^{-5}	1×10^{-3}	5×10^{-7}	3×10^{-5}	5×10^{-7}	1×10^{-5}	2×10^{-8}	1×10^{-6}
Tornado[e]	EU	2×10^{-4}	2×10^{-2}	7×10^{-6}	1×10^{-3}	2×10^{-4}	4×10^{-3}	5×10^{-6}	2×10^{-4}

[a] Values shown are the consequences if the accident did occur. The risk of an accident is the consequence (LCFs) times the estimated frequency times 20 years of operations. The estimated frequencies are as follows: likely (L), 0.1; unlikely (U), 0.001; extremely unlikely (EU), 0.00001; incredible (I), 0.000001.

[b] The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one that would result in the highest risks to the general public MEI. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category. Absence of an accident in a certain frequency category indicates that the accident would not result in a release of radioactive material.

[c] Accident frequencies: likely (L), estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ($> 10^{-2}$/yr); unlikely (U), estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations ($10^{-2} – 10^{-4}$/yr); extremely unlikely (EU), estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ($10^{-4} – 10^{-6}$/yr); incredible (I), estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations ($< 10^{-6}$/yr).

[d] Maximum and minimum risks reflect differences in assumed sites, technologies, and meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, maximum risks would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with 1 m/s wind speed, whereas minimum risks would occur under D stability with 4 m/s wind speed.

[e] Meteorological conditions analyzed for the tornado were D stability with 20 m/s wind speed.

TABLE F.10 Number of Persons with Potential for Adverse Effects from Accidents under the Conversion Options[a]

Option/Accident[b]	Frequency Category[c]	Maximum Number of Persons[d]				Minimum Number of Persons[d]			
		Noninvolved Workers		General Public		Noninvolved Workers		General Public	
		MEI[e]	Population	MEI[e]	Population	MEI[e]	Population	MEI[e]	Population
Conversion to U_3O_8									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes	240	No	0	Yes	2	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	520	Yes	10	Yes[f]	52	No	0
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	EU	Yes	310	Yes	2,500	Yes[f]	0	Yes	3
HF tank rupture	I	Yes	1,100	Yes	41,000	Yes	770	Yes	18
Conversion to UO_2									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes	240	No	0	Yes	2	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	520	Yes	10	Yes[f]	52	No	0
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	EU	Yes	310	Yes	2,500	Yes[f]	0	Yes	3
HF tank rupture	I	Yes	1,100	Yes	41,000	Yes	770	Yes	18
Conversion to metal									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes	240	No	0	Yes	2	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	520	Yes	10	Yes[f]	52	No	0
Vehicle-induced fire, 3 full 48G cylinders	EU	Yes	310	Yes	2,500	Yes[f]	0	Yes	3
HF tank rupture	I	Yes	1,100	Yes	41,000	Yes	770	Yes	18
Cylinder treatment									
U_3O_8 drum spill[g]	L	No	0	No	0	No	0	No	0
Loss of scrubber water[g]	U	No	0	No	0	No[i]	0	No	0
Tornado[h]	EU	Yes	1	No	0	NA[i]	NA	NA	NA

[a] Values shown are the consequences if the accident did occur. The risk of an accident is the consequence (number of persons) times the estimated frequency times 20 years of operations. The estimated frequencies are as follows: likely (L), 0.1; unlikely (U), 0.001; extremely unlikely (EU), 0.00001; incredible (I), 0.000001.

[b] The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one in which the largest number of people (workers plus off-site population) would be affected. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category.

[c] Accident frequencies: likely (L), estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations (> 10^{-2}/yr); unlikely (U), estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations ($10^{-2} – 10^{-4}$/yr); extremely unlikely (EU), estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ($10^{-4} – 10^{-6}$/yr); incredible (I), estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations (< 10^{-6}/yr).

[d] Maximum and minimum values reflect differences in assumed meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, the maximum risks would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with 1 m/s wind speed, whereas the minimum risks would occur under D stability with 4 m/s wind speed.

[e] At the MEI location, the determination is either "Yes" or "No" for potential adverse effects to an individual.

[f] MEI locations were evaluated at 100 m from ground-level releases for workers and at the location of highest off-site concentration for members of the general public; the population risks are 0 because the worker and general public population distributions for the representative sites were used, which did not show receptors at the MEI locations.

[g] These accidents would result in the largest plume sizes, although no people would be affected.

[h] Meteorological conditions analyzed for the tornado were D stability with 20 m/s wind speed.

[i] NA = not applicable.

TABLE F.11 Number of Persons with Potential for Irreversible Adverse Effects from Accidents under the Conversion Options[a]

Option/Accident[b]	Frequency Category[c]	Maximum Number of Persons[d]				Minimum Number of Persons[d]			
		Noninvolved Workers		General Public		Noninvolved Workers		General Public	
		MEI[e]	Population	MEI[e]	Population	MEI[e]	Population	MEI[e]	Population
Conversion to U_3O_8									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes	5	No	0	No	0	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	370	Yes[f]	0	Yes	3	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Yes	440	Yes[f]	0	Yes	4	No	0
Ammonia tank rupture	I	Yes	420	Yes	1,700	Yes	180	Yes	8
Conversion to UO_2									
Ammonia stripper overpressure	L	Yes	40	No	0	No	0	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	370	Yes[f]	0	Yes	3	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Yes	440	Yes[f]	0	Yes	4	No	0
Ammonia tank rupture	I	Yes	420	Yes	1,700	Yes	180	Yes	8
Conversion to metal									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes	5	No	0	No	0	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	370	Yes[f]	0	Yes	3	No	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Yes	440	Yes[f]	0	Yes	4	No	0
Ammonia tank rupture	I	Yes	420	Yes	1,700	Yes	180	Yes	8
Cylinder treatment									
U_3O_8 drum spill[g]	L	No	0	No	0	No	0	No	0
Loss of scrubber water[g]	U	No[f]	0	No	0	No[i]	0	No	0
Tornado[h]	EU	Yes[f]	0	No	0	NA[i]	NA	NA	NA

[a] Values shown are the consequences if the accident did occur. The risk of an accident is the consequence (number of persons) times the estimated frequency times 20 years of operations. The estimated frequencies are as follows: likely (L), 0.1; unlikely (U), 0.001; extremely unlikely (EU), 0.00001; incredible (I), 0.000001.

[b] The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one in which the largest number of people (workers plus off-site population) would be affected. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category.

[c] Accident frequencies: likely (L), estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations (> 10^{-2}/yr); unlikely (U), estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations ($10^{-2} – 10^{-4}$/yr); extremely unlikely (EU), estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ($10^{-4} –10^{-6}$/yr); incredible (I), estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations (< 10^{-6}/yr).

[d] Maximum and minimum values reflect different meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, the maximum risks would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with 1 m/s wind speed, whereas the minimum risks would occur under D stability with 4 m/s wind speed. An exception is worker impacts for the ammonia tank rupture, for which maximum risks would occur under D stability with 4 m/s wind speed.

[e] At the MEI location, the determination is either "Yes" or "No" for potential irreversible adverse affects to an individual.

[f] MEI locations were evaluated at 100 m from ground-level releases for workers and at the location of highest off-site concentration for members of the general public; the population risks are 0 because the worker and general public population distributions for the representative sites were used, which did not show receptors at the MEI locations.

[g] These accidents would result in the largest plume sizes, although no people would be affected.

[h] Meteorological conditions analyzed for the tornado were D stability with 20 m/s wind speed.

[i] NA = not applicable.

people with potential for irreversible adverse effects. The tables present the results for the accident within each frequency category that would affect the largest number of people (total of workers and off-site population) (Policastro et al. 1997). The numbers of noninvolved workers and members of the off-site public represent the impacts if the associated accident was assumed to occur. The accidents listed in Tables F.10 and F.11 are not identical because an accident with the largest impacts for adverse effects might not lead to the largest impacts for irreversible adverse effects. The impacts may be summarized as follows:

- If the accidents identified in Tables F.10 and F.11 did occur, the number of persons in the off-site population with potential for adverse effects would range from 0 to 41,000 (maximum corresponding to HF tank rupture), and the number of off-site persons with potential for irreversible adverse effects would range from 0 to 1,700 (maximum corresponding to ammonia tank rupture).

- If the accidents identified in Tables F.10 and F.11 were to occur, the number of noninvolved workers with potential for adverse effects would range from 0 to 1,100 (maximum corresponding to HF tank rupture), and the number of noninvolved workers with potential for irreversible adverse effects would range from 0 to 440 (maximum corresponding to corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions — water pool).

- The largest impacts would be caused by HF tank rupture; corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain; ammonia tank rupture; and vehicle-induced fire involving three full 48G cylinders. Accidents involving stack emissions would have very small impacts compared with accidents involving releases at ground level due to the large dilution (and lower source terms due to filtration and deposition) involved with the stack emissions.

- The bounding accidents for the conversion options (conversion to U_3O_8, UO_2, and metal) would have nearly identical impacts.

- For the most severe accidents in each frequency category, the noninvolved worker MEI and the public MEI would have the potential for both adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects. The likely accidents for each conversion option (frequency of more than one chance in 100 per year) would result in no potential adverse or irreversible adverse effects for the general public. The generally reduced impacts to the public MEI compared with the noninvolved worker MEI are related to dispersion of the chemical release with downwind distance (except for UF_6 cylinder fire with plume rise).

- The maximum risk was computed as the product of the consequence (number of people) times the frequency of occurrence (per year) times the number of years of operations (20 years, 2009 through 2028). The results indicate that the

maximum risk values would be less than 1 for all accidents except the following:

- *Potential Adverse Effects:*

    Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions (L, likely): Workers
    Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain (U, unlikely): Workers

- *Potential Irreversible Adverse Effects:*

    Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions (L, likely): Workers
    Ammonia stripper overpressure (L, likely): Workers
    Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain (U, unlikely): Workers

These risk values are conservative because the numbers of people affected were based on assuming (1) meteorological conditions that would result in the maximum reasonably foreseeable plume size (i.e., F stability and 1 m/s wind speed) and (2) wind in the direction that would lead to maximum numbers of individuals exposed for noninvolved workers or for the general population.

To aid in the interpretation of accident analysis results, the number of fatalities potentially associated with the estimated irreversible adverse effects was calculated. For the worker and general public accidents involving UF$_6$ releases shown in Table F.10, exposure to HF and uranium compounds could be high enough to result in death for 1% or less of the persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997). Thus, for the corroded cylinder spill accidents having a range of 0 to 440 irreversible adverse effects for noninvolved workers, approximately 0 to 4 worker deaths would be expected; no deaths would be expected for members of the general public from such accidents. For the ammonia tank rupture accident caused by an earthquake, exposure to ammonia would result in death for about 2% of the persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects. This would correspond to about 4 to 8 deaths among noninvolved workers and 0 to 34 deaths for the general public. These are the maximum potential consequences of the accidents; the upper ends of the ranges result from assuming worst-case weather conditions, with the wind blowing in the direction where the highest number of people would be exposed.

F.3.2.3 Physical Hazards

The risk of on-the-job fatalities and injuries to all conversion facility workers was calculated using industry-specific statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as reported by the National Safety Council (1995). Annual fatality and injury rates for construction and manufacturing, respectively, were used for the construction and operational phases of the conversion facility lifetime.

No on-the-job fatalities are predicted for any of the options analyzed, but a range of about 300 to 500 injuries is predicted during the conversion facility lifetimes. Overall, the largest impacts are predicted for conversion to UO$_2$ through gelation and for conversion to metal through batch reduction because these options require larger numbers of employees. All other conversion options would result in similar impacts; fewer impacts are predicted for the cylinder treatment facility (i.e., approximately 170 injuries).

Because the conversion technologies analyzed for conversion of U$_3$O$_8$ would employ almost the same number of workers, there are essentially no differences between them. There would be a probability of about 0.35 of an on-the-job fatality (sum of 0.18 for the construction phase and 0.17 for the operations phase) for the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion options (Table F.12). The predicted injury incidence would be about 285 injuries over the lifetime of the facility.

The predicted probability of worker fatalities for conversion to UO$_2$ ranges from 0.4 to 0.59 (Table F.12). The predicted injury incidence ranges from about 320 to 492 injuries over the lifetime of the UO$_2$ conversion facility. The upper ends of the ranges result from the larger number of workers required for operation of the gelation facility.

The predicted probability of worker fatalities for conversion to metal ranges from about 0.4 to 0.55 (Table F.12). The predicted injury incidence ranges from about 300 to 490 injuries over the lifetime of the metal conversion facility. The upper ends of the ranges result from the larger number of workers required for operation of the batch reduction facility.

For the cylinder treatment facility option, the probability of an on-the-job fatality is about 0.19 (sum of 0.08 for the construction phase and 0.11 for the operations phase) (Table F.12). The estimated injury incidence would be about 170 over the lifetime of the facility.

F.3.3 Air Quality

Additional details regarding the analysis of air quality impacts for the conversion option are presented in Tschanz (1997).

F.3.3.1 Construction

The annual emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO$_2$), nitrogen dioxide (NO$_2$), hydrocarbons (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM$_{10}$) expected during conversion plant construction are listed in Table F.13. The estimated 1-hour maximum pollutant concentrations at the facility boundary during construction are shown in Table F.14. Additional estimates were made for the conversion technology that had the highest estimated 1-hour maximum pollutant concentrations (i.e., gelation); these estimated concentrations are given in Table F.15. Although all of these pollutant concentrations would be much higher than those for plant operations, they remain below

TABLE F.12 Potential Impacts to Human Health from Physical Hazards under Accident Conditions for the Conversion Options[a]

| | Impacts to Conversion Facility Workers[b] | | | |
| | Incidence of Fatalities | | Incidence of Injuries | |
Option	Construction	Operations	Construction	Operations
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	0.18	0.16–0.17	66	215–219
Conversion to UO$_2$	0.22–0.30	0.18–0.29	79–108	243–384
Conversion to metal	0.22–0.25	0.17–0.30	79–92	222–395
Cylinder treatment	0.08	0.11	30	140

[a] Impacts are reported as ranges, which result from variations in the employment requirements for the different conversion technologies for each option.

[b] Potential hazards were estimated for all conversion facility workers.

Source: Injury and fatality rates used in calculations taken from National Safety Council (1995).

TABLE F.13 Emissions to the Atmosphere from Construction of a Depleted UF$_6$ Conversion Plant during the Peak Year

| | Emissions to Atmosphere (tons/yr) | | | | |
Option	SO$_2$	NO$_2$	HC	CO	PM$_{10}$
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	2	28	8	190	40–50
Conversion to UO$_2$	2–3	30–46	8–13	200–320	50–60
Conversion to metal	2–3	30–40	8–12	200–270	50–60

Source: LLNL (1997).

ambient air quality standards. One possible exception is PM$_{10}$, for which concentrations were estimated to be 90% of the 24-hour standard of 150 µg/m^3. Some fugitive dust control measures would be necessary to mitigate this potentially high concentration. Construction of the conversion plant in a region of already high, even if compliant, ambient pollutant concentrations might require consideration of changes and/or controls for the emission of the other pollutants as well.

Estimated emissions from the cylinder treatment facility for all aspects of construction and operations are of the same order of magnitude (generally about 0.4 to 0.7 times as large) as those associated with the baseline cylinder transfer facility (see Appendix E), and the cylinder treatment facility area would be about half as large as the baseline cylinder transfer facility area. Except for the

TABLE F.14 Maximum 1-Hour Average Pollutant Concentrations at the Nearest Point on the Facility Boundary from Construction of a Conversion Facility[a]

Option	SO$_2$	NO$_2$	HC	CO	PM$_{10}$
			Pollutant (µg/m^3)		
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	26	360	100	2,400	520
Conversion to UO$_2$	25–37	380–570	100–160	2,400–3,900	620–740
Conversion to metal	25–36	360–480	100–140	2,500–3,200	610–720

[a] The ranges shown for some pollutants include results from the various technologies used for the conversion option and the differences in representative sites used for analysis.

TABLE F.15 Maximum Air Quality Impacts from Conversion Facility Construction[a]

	Estimated Pollutant Emissions[b]							
	1-Hour Average		8-Hour Average		24-Hour Average		Annual Average	
Pollutant	Concentration[c] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[d]	Concentration[c] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[d]	Concentration[c] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[d]	Concentration[c] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[d]
CO	3,810	0.1	3,100	0.30	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	16	0.17
SO$_2$	–	–	–	–	5.8	0.02	0.9	0.01
PM$_{10}$	–	–	–	–	136	0.90	21	0.42

[a] Estimated pollutant emissions are given for the conversion to UO$_2$ gelation option, which would have the highest emissions.

[b] Values are listed only for pollutant/averaging time period combinations that have applicable air quality standards.

[c] Concentrations are the second highest values estimated for one entire year. Short-term standards are not to be exceeded more than once per year.

[d] Ratio of the concentration to the respective air quality standard. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the standard would not be exceeded.

1-hour average results, the analytical results shown in Table F.16 for the cylinder treatment facility are about 0.2 to 0.4 times as large as those shown in Appendix E, Tables E.9-E.11, for the cylinder transfer facility. The 1-hour average impacts of construction of a cylinder treatment facility would be essentially the same as those for cylinder transfer facility construction.

F.3.3.2 Operations

Hourly emission rates during operations were determined from annual emission rates given in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997); these rates are shown in Table F.17. The methods used to analyze the impacts of pollutant emissions are described in Appendix C. All air pollutant concentrations during operations would be well below applicable ambient air quality standards for all conversion options. The maximum ground-level atmospheric concentrations at the representative facility boundaries from the boiler stack's emissions are listed in Tables F.18 through F.20. At the upper ends of the ranges, the nearest any of the criteria pollutant concentrations would come to a corresponding air quality standard is the annual nitrogen oxides (NO_x) concentration, which would be between 0.0007 and 0.002 of the annual NO_x standard.

Maximum air quality impacts from the process stacks are also listed in Tables F.18 through F.20. State HF standards in Tennessee and Kentucky have been used for comparative purposes. The estimated 24-hour maximum HF concentrations at representative facility boundaries for the conversion to U_3O_8 with anhydrous HF are about 2% of the respective state standards. The batch conversion to uranium metal is the only case for which NO_2 would be emitted from the process stack, and the NO_2 emission rate from the process stack in that case would be about eight times larger than from the boiler stack. Nevertheless, the estimated maximum annual NO_2 concentrations at the representative facility boundaries are less than 1% of the respective state standards.

TABLE F.16 Air Quality Impacts from Construction of the Cylinder Treatment Facility

	Estimated Pollutant Emissions							
	1-Hour Average		8-Hour Average		24-Hour Average		Annual Average	
Pollutant	Range[a] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[b]	Range[a] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[b]	Range[a] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[b]	Range[a] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[b]
CO	1,800 – 3,500	0.088	310 – 450	0.045	120 – 180	–	7.2 – 13	–
NO_x	280 – 520	–	47 – 69	–	19 – 27	–	1.1 – 2.0	0.02
PM_{10}	390 – 720	–	65 – 95	–	26 – 37	0.25	1.5 – 2.6	0.052

[a] Concentrations are the second highest values estimated for one entire year. Short-term standards are not to be exceeded more than once per year.

[b] Ratio of the upper end of the concentration range to the respective air quality standard. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the standard is not exceeded. Pollutant/averaging time period combinations for which no air quality standard exists are noted with a dash (–).

TABLE F.17 Emissions to the Atmosphere from Operation of a Depleted UF$_6$ Conversion Plant

Option/Source	Emissions to Atmosphere (lb/yr)						
	SO_2	NO_2	HC	CO	PM_{10}	HF	Uranium Compounds
Conversion to U_3O_8							
Boiler stack	60–80	8,300–10,000	180–200	4,100–5,000	310–400	–	–
Process stack	–	–	–	–	–	300–900	3.3 U_3O_8
Generator stack	60	400	400	2,300	80	–	–
Conversion to UO_2							
Boiler stack	23–820	3,800–110,000	170–2,300	800–55,000	290–4,100	–	–
Process stack	–	–	–	–	–	300–900	2.5–12 UO_2
Generator stack	54–80	400–720	400–690	2,300–3,700	20–140	–	–
Conversion to metal							
Boiler stack	60–100	8,200–14,000	170–290	4,000–6,700	300–500	–	–
Process stack	–	117,000	–	–	–	300	1.2–9.6 U_3O_8; 3.8 UF_4
Generator stack	54–60	460–600	410–490	2,700–3,600	90–120	–	–

Source: LLNL (1997).

Each emergency generator would operate for 300 hours or less during 1 year. When it was operating, however, an emergency generator would produce higher concentrations of criteria pollutants at the facility boundaries than would the boiler. The estimated pollutant concentrations from the generator are listed in Tables F.18 through F.20. Compared with the air quality standards, the estimated concentrations are no more than 5% of allowed values.

The boiler stack parameters are identical for the cylinder treatment facility and the baseline cylinder transfer facility (see Appendix E). Given the similarities in the input data, the results of the air quality analyses for the two facilities should be expected to be comparable. Although not presented explicitly here, the same can be said of the impacts for operations. In summary, all of the criteria pollutant impacts of the cylinder treatment facility would not differ substantially from those of the cylinder transfer facility; all of the impacts not explicitly noted here are considered to be negligible. The only pollutant of concern emitted by the cylinder treatment facility process stack would be HF, and it, too, would be comparable for the two facilities. The cylinder treatment facility process stack would produce maximum annual average HF concentrations of $1.6 \times 10^{-6} \mu g/m^3$. This concentration is several orders of magnitude smaller than any applicable HF air quality standard.

No quantitative estimate was made of the impacts on the criterion pollutant ozone. Ozone formation is a regional issue that would be affected by emissions data for the entire area around a proposed conversion site. The pollutants most related to ozone formation that would result from the

TABLE F.18 Air Quality Impacts from Operations for Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Option/ Stack/ Pollutant	Estimated Pollutant Emissions[a]							
	1-Hour Average		8-Hour Average		24-Hour Average		Annual Average	
	Range[b] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] (µg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ with Anhydrous HF								
Boiler stack								
CO	0.92 – 1.01	3×10^{-5}	0.37 – 0.63	6×10^{-5}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.054 – 0.090	0.0009
Generator stack								
CO	320 – 440	0.011	64 – 270	0.027	–	–	Not calculated	
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	Not calculated	
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.025 – 0.069	0.02	0.0040 – 0.0073	2×10^{-5}
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.4×10^{-5} – 2.6×10^{-5}	NS[d]
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ with HF Neutralization								
Boiler stack								
CO	0.81 – 0.89	2×10^{-5}	0.31 – 0.57	6×10^{-5}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.046 – 0.077	0.0008
Generator stack								
CO	320 – 440	0.011	64 – 270	0.027	–	–	Not calculated	
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	Not calculated	
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.0091 – 0.022	0.006	0.0012 – 0.0023	6×10^{-6}
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.000013 – 0.000026	NS

[a] Values are listed only for pollutant/averaging time period combinations with air quality standards.

[b] Concentrations are the second highest values estimated for one entire year. Short-term standards are not to be exceeded more than once per year.

[c] Ratio of the upper end of the concentration range to the respective air quality standard. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the standard is not exceeded.

[d] NS = No annual average air quality standard is available for U$_3$O$_8$.

TABLE F.19 Air Quality Impacts from Operations for Conversion to UO$_2$

Option/ Stack/ Pollutant	Estimated Pollutant Emissions[a]							
	1-Hour Average		8-Hour Average		24-Hour Average		Annual Average	
	Range[b] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] ($\mu g/m^3$)	Fraction of Standard[c]
Conversion to UO$_2$ with Anhydrous HF								
Boiler stack								
CO	0.77 – 0.82	2×10^{-5}	0.31 – 0.51	5×10^{-5}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.045 – 0.079	0.0008
Generator stack								
CO	550 – 690	0.017	120 – 440	0.044	–	–	Not calculated	
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	Not calculated	
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.020 – 0.052	0.015	0.0030 – 0.0064	2×10^{-5}
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	4×10^{-5} – 8.5×10^{-5}	NS[d]
Conversion to UO$_2$ with HF Neutralization								
Boiler stack								
CO	0.71 – 0.77	2×10^{-5}	0.28 – 0.47	5×10^{-5}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.041 – 0.070	0.0007
Generator stack								
CO	550 – 690	0.017	120 – 440	0.044	–	–	Not calculated	
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	Not calculated	
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.0067 – 0.017	0.005	0.00099 – 0.0021	5×10^{-6}
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.0×10^{-5} – 8.4×10^{-5}	NS[d]
Conversion to UO$_2$ with Gelation Process								
Boiler stack								
CO	1.7 – 1.8	5×10^{-5}	0.71 – 1.3	1×10^{-4}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.058 – 0.17	0.002
Generator stack								
CO	NA[e]	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NO$_x$	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.016 – 0.029	0.01	0.0022 – 0.0040	1×10^{-5}
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.0×10^{-5} – 1.7×10^{-5}	NS[d]

[a]   Values are listed only for pollutant/averaging time period combinations with air quality standards.

[b]   Concentrations are the second highest values estimated for one entire year. Short-term standards are not to be exceeded more than once per year.

[c]   Ratio of the upper end of the concentration range to the respective air quality standard. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the standard is not exceeded.

[d]   NS = No annual average air quality standard is available for U$_3$O$_8$.

[e]   NA = Data not available.

TABLE F.20 Air Quality Impacts from Operations for Conversion to Uranium Metal

Option/ Stack/ Pollutant	Estimated Pollutant Emissions[a]							
	1-Hour Average		8-Hour Average		24-Hour Average		Annual Average	
	Range[b] (μg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] (μg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] (μg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]	Range[b] (μg/m^3)	Fraction of Standard[c]
Batch Process								
Boiler stack								
CO	0.88 – 0.90	2×10^{-5}	0.35 – 0.56	6×10^{-5}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.049 – 0.101	0.0010
Generator stack								
CO	580 – 720	0.018	120 – 460	0.046	–	–	Not calculated	
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	Not calculated	
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.0061 – 0.0125	0.004	0.00083 – 0.0019	5×10^{-6}
UF$_4$	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.0×10^{-5} – 2.4×10^{-5}	NS[d]
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.6×10^{-5} – 6.1×10^{-5}	NS
NO$_2$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.32 – 0.74	0.007
Continuous Process								
Boiler stack								
CO	0.71 – 0.77	2×10^{-5}	0.28 – 0.47	5×10^{-5}	–	–	–	–
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.042 – 0.072	0.0007
Generator stack								
CO	550 – 690	0.017	120 – 440	0.044	–	–	Not calculated	
NO$_x$	–	–	–	–	–	–	Not calculated	
Process stack								
HF	–	–	–	–	0.0068 – 0.0172	0.005	0.0010 – 0.0021	5×10^{-6}
UF$_4$	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.3×10^{-5} – 2.7×10^{-5}	NS
U$_3$O$_8$	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.1×10^{-5} – 8.6×10^{-5}	NS

[a] Values are listed only for pollutant/averaging time period combinations with air quality standards.

[b] Concentrations are the second highest values estimated for one entire year. Short-term standards are not to be exceeded more than once per year.

[c] Ratio of the upper end of the concentration range to the respective air quality standard. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the standard is not exceeded.

[d] NS = No annual average air quality standard is available for this pollutant.

conversion of depleted UF$_6$ are HC and NO$_x$. In later Phase II studies, when specific technologies and sites would be selected, the potential effects on ozone of these pollutants at a proposed site could be put in perspective by comparing them with the total emissions of HC and NO$_x$ in the surrounding area. Small additional contributions to the totals would be unlikely to alter the ozone attainment status of the region.

F.3.4 Water and Soil

This section discusses impacts of the conversion options on surface water, groundwater, and soils. The impacts are evaluated over a range of conditions present at the representative sites and are also relevant for a similarly sized generic site located in the vicinity of a river that could be used to supply water for construction and normal operations and to receive liquid waste discharges. The major conversion option parameters are summarized in Table F.21.

F.3.4.1 Surface Water

The methodology used to determine potential impacts to surface water for each conversion technology is described in Appendix C and Tomasko (1997).

F.3.4.1.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Construction. Construction of a U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would produce increased runoff to nearby surface waters because of replacing soil and vegetation with either buildings or paved areas, approximately 13 acres (5.3 ha) (LLNL 1997). The amount of increased runoff would be negligible compared with the assumed existing area for runoff (0.3 to 0.8% of the representative site areas). None of the construction activities would measurably affect floodplains.

Table F.21 shows the quantity of water that would be used during construction of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility (about 8 million gal/yr). This water would be withdrawn from nearby rivers or pumped from underlying aquifers. If the rate of water consumption were constant, the average rate of withdrawal would be about 15 gpm. This rate of withdrawal would be negligible compared to average flows in the adjacent rivers (less than 0.0001%). If the water were obtained from aquifers, there would be no impacts to the surface waters. Construction impacts would, therefore, range from none to negligible.

For construction, the net volume of water disposed of would be about 4 million gal/yr (7.6 gpm) (Table F.21). The primary contaminants of concern would be construction chemicals, organics, and some suspended solids. The wastewater would be discharged to nearby surface waters under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, or to an appropriate

TABLE F.21 Summary of Conversion Option Parameters Affecting Water Quality and Soil[a]

Option	Disturbed Land Area (acres)	Operations Area (acres)	Construction Water (million gal/yr)	Operations Water (million gal/yr)
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	20	13	Raw = 8 Waste = 4	Raw = 34 – 47 Waste = 15 – 23 Sanitary = 1.2
Conversion to UO$_2$	22 – 31	14 – 20	Raw = 4 – 12 Waste = 5 – 6	Raw = 41 – 285 Waste = 9.7 – 135 Sanitary = 0.7 – 2.3
Conversion to metal	23 – 26	15 – 16	Raw = 10 – 12 Waste = 5 – 6	Raw = 55 Waste = 25 – 26 Sanitary = 1.4 – 2.3

Option	Accident Scenario	Radioactive Release to Surface Water[a] (Ci/yr)	Radioactive Effluent Concentration[b] (pCi/L)	Dilution Factor[c]	Surface Water Concentration (pCi/L)
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	HF pipeline break	0.001	12 – 17	47,000 – 4,200,000	4.1×10^{-6} – 2.6×10^{-4}
Conversion to UO$_2$	HF pipeline break	0.002 – 0.003	6 – 21	42,000 – 500,000	1.2×10^{-5} – 5.0×10^{-4}
Conversion to metal	HF pipeline break	0.001 – 0.002	10 – 21	42,000 – 2,600,000	4.0×10^{-6} – 4.9×10^{-4}

[a] Data from engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997).

[b] Concentration derived from estimated annual radioactive release and annual wastewater discharge.

[c] Dilution factor based on average flow conditions in receiving rivers.

wastewater sewer. By following good engineering practices (e.g., stockpiling materials away from surface water drainages, covering construction piles with tarps to prevent erosion by precipitation, and cleaning up small chemical spills as soon as they occur), concentrations in the wastewater would be small (well below any drinking water criteria).

Once in the surface water, mixing and dilution of the pollutants would occur. This dilution would be greater than 270,000:1 for average flow conditions in nearby rivers. This amount of dilution would reduce any contamination present to concentrations well below regulatory standards. Because the concentration of contamination in the water would be very low, impacts to sediment in the streams would also be negligible.

Operations. For normal operations, no impacts would occur to surface runoff, and there would be no measurable impacts on floodplains (effluent discharges to surface waters less than 0.001% of the average flows). As indicated in Table F.21, normal operation of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would require at most 47 million gal/yr (approximately 89 gpm) of raw water. If this water were obtained from nearby rivers, impacts would be negligible, less than 0.004% of the average flows. If the raw water were obtained from wells, there would be no impacts to surface waters.

A maximum of 23 million gal/yr of wastewater would be generated during operations, including cooling tower blowdown, process water, and industrial waste water. Another 1.2 million gal/yr of sanitary wastewater would be produced (Table F.21). For constant rates of discharge, about 44 gpm of wastewater and 2.3 gpm of sanitary water would be released to the environment at approved NPDES locations.

The primary contaminants of concern for the wastewater would be uranium and chemicals used to inhibit rust, reduce friction, and enhance heat exchange (e.g., copolymers, phosphates, phosphonates, calcium, magnesium, nitrates, sodium, and potassium). As discussed in the engineering analysis report (LLNL 1997), approximately 0.001 Ci/yr of uranium with an activity of 4×10^{-7} Ci/g would be released in the discharge water. For a waste volume of 23 million gal/yr (Table F.21), the uranium concentration in the effluent would be about 30 µg/L. After dilution in nearby surface water, the concentration would be much less than the proposed U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drinking water standard for uranium of 20 µg/L, used here for comparison. Concentrations of the other chemicals released would also be expected to be very low and within the guidelines of an NPDES permit.

Accident Scenarios. Most of the accidents analyzed would involve outdoor releases on impermeable concrete pads in the cylinder yards; such releases could be cleaned up with little loss of the contaminated material to the soil. The only postulated accident that would release contaminated water to the environment is an HF pipeline break produced by an earthquake (Table F.21). Anhydrous HF would be pumped from the process building to the HF storage building through an underground pipeline that would carry liquid HF at a rate of 10 gpm (0.63 L/s) through 200 ft (61 m) of 1-in. (2.5-cm) pipe. For this accident scenario, 100% of the HF would drain into the ground at a point 3 ft (0.91 m) below grade during a 10-minute period. Approximately 500 lb (227 kg) of liquid HF (60 gal [227 L]) would be released. After 48 hours, the contaminated soil was assumed to be removed. Because of the rapid response to the accident, the HF would have little time to travel into the soil. For a silty sand, the travel distance would be about 2 ft (6.1 m) (Tomasko 1997). Removal of the contaminated soil and soil water would prevent any contamination problems to the groundwater and would prevent any cross contamination with surface waters. Therefore, there would be no net impact from this accident. Because this accident scenario would not affect surface runoff or existing floodplains, impacts to these parameters would also be nonexistent.

F.3.4.1.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

The environmental parameters associated with the UO$_2$ conversion alternatives are similar to those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (Table F.21), except for raw water use, which would be about five times larger for normal operations. If water were withdrawn from a nearby river, impacts would be negligible and would be less than 0.03% of the average flows. If it were withdrawn from wells, there would be no surface water impacts. Because of this option's similarities to the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion option, impacts to surface water produced by UO$_2$ conversion would be essentially the same as those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (i.e., none to negligible).

As was the case for the conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ option, discharge waters would receive from 0.002 to 0.003 Ci/yr. For the water discharges listed in Table F.21, the equivalent concentrations would range from 6 to 76 pCi/L (30 to 400 µg/L). After dilution in nearby surface waters, concentrations would be much less than the EPA proposed drinking water standard for uranium, used here for comparison.

F.3.4.1.3 Conversion to Metal

The environmental parameters associated with conversion to metal are very similar to those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (Table F.21); however, raw water usage for construction and normal operation would be about 50% higher. If the construction water was obtained from a nearby river, the rate of withdrawal would be negligible compared to average flows (less than 0.001%). For normal operations, the increased rate of withdrawal would produce an impact less than 0.005% of the average flows. If the construction water and water for normal operations were obtained from wells, there would be no impacts on surface water.

As was the case for the conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ and UO$_2$ options, discharge waters would receive either 0.001 or 0.002 Ci/yr. For the water discharges listed in Table F.21, the equivalent concentrations would range from 25 to 53 µg/L. After dilution in nearby surface waters, the concentrations would be much less than the EPA proposed drinking water standard for uranium, used here for comparison.

F.3.4.1.4 Cylinder Treatment

Construction and operation of the cylinder treatment facility would use less land and water and produce less wastewater than the construction and operation of conversion facilities, as shown in Table F.22. Thus, potential impacts would be smaller. There are no postulated accidents that would directly release contaminants to surface water (LLNL 1997).

**TABLE F.22 Summary of Environmental Parameters
for the Cylinder Treatment Facility**

Parameter	Unit	Construction	Operations	Accidents	
Land area	acres	8.7	–	None	
Disturbed land	acres	4.5	–	None	
Water	million gal/yr	3.6	3.4	None	|
Wastewater[a]	million gal/yr	1.3	2.3	None	|

[a] Includes sanitary wastewater, cooling tower blowdown, industrial water,
and process water.

F.3.4.2 Groundwater

The methodology for assessing impacts to groundwater for each conversion technology is described in detail in Appendix C and Tomasko (1997).

F.3.4.2.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Potential impacts to groundwater could occur during construction, normal operations, and postulated accident scenarios. These impacts include the following: changes in effective recharge to underlying aquifers; changes in the depth to groundwater; changes in the direction of groundwater flow; and changes in groundwater quality.

If construction water were supplied from underlying aquifers, approximately 15 gpm would be withdrawn. This withdrawal represents a maximum 0.1% increase in extraction over that at representative facilities and would produce a negligible impact on the groundwater system. If the construction water were obtained from surface water, there would be no groundwater impacts. Groundwater quality could also be impacted by construction activities. For example, exposed chemicals could be mobilized by precipitation and infiltrate the surficial aquifers. By following good engineering and construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals to prevent interaction with rainfall, promptly cleaning up any chemical spills, and providing retention basins to catch and hold any contaminated runoff), groundwater concentrations would be less than the EPA guidelines.

Normal operations of the conversion facility would require about 65 gpm of raw water (Table F.21). If pumped from wells in the surficial aquifers, the impact would be negligible (0.5% increase in extraction). If withdrawn from nearby surface water, there would be no impact on groundwater. Because discharges to groundwater are not planned for normal operations, there would

be no direct impacts to groundwater quality. Potential impacts could be derived from interaction with surface water; however, because impacts to surface water are negligible, impacts to groundwater via a surface water pathway would be even less.

As discussed in Section F.3.4.1.1, only one accident scenario, the HF pipeline break, would potentially release contaminants to the groundwater (Table F.21). Because of rapid mitigation and the small volume of HF in the release, this scenario would have a negligible impact on groundwater quality and would not affect recharge, depth to groundwater, or direction of flow.

F.3.4.2.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

The environmental parameters associated with the UO$_2$ conversion alternatives are very similar to those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (Table F.21), except for raw water use during normal operations (about five times larger). If water were obtained from underlying aquifers, pumping would represent an increase of about 5% of the current groundwater use. These impacts would be negligible.

F.3.4.2.3 Conversion to Metal

The environmental parameters associated with the metal conversion alternatives are very similar to those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (Table F.21), except for a 50% increase in raw water use during construction and normal operations. If the water for construction and normal operations was obtained from underlying aquifers, pumping would increase by 0.15% above current usage during construction, and by 0.8% of the current use for normal operations. These impacts would be negligible. If the water needed for construction and operations was obtained from surface water, there would be no impacts to groundwater.

During construction, groundwater concentrations would be kept below EPA guidelines (EPA 1996) by following good engineering practices. During normal operations, there would be no impacts to groundwater quality because direct discharges to groundwater are not planned.

F.3.4.2.4 Cylinder Treatment Facility

For the cylinder treatment facility, there would be no direct impacts to groundwater during normal operations because groundwater would not be used to supply the water required (Table F.22) and there would be no discharges of wastewater to the ground. Impacts to groundwater during construction of the cylinder treatment facility include changes in effective recharge, changes in the depth to the water table, changes in the direction of groundwater flow, and changes in quality.

Construction of the cylinder treatment facility would decrease the permeability of about 4.5 acres (1.8 ha) of land because of paving and building. This loss of permeable land would reduce

recharge, increase the depth to the water table, and change the direction of groundwater flow; however, because the area affected would be small (about 0.1 to 0.3% of the land area available), these impacts would be negligible and limited to small, local regions in the immediate vicinity of the paved lots and building footprints.

During construction, groundwater quality would also be impacted. For example, stockpiled chemicals could be mobilized by precipitation and infiltrate the surficial aquifers. By following good engineering and construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals to prevent interaction with rain, promptly cleaning up any chemical spills, and providing retention basins to catch and hold any contaminated runoff), groundwater concentrations would be less than the EPA guidelines.

F.3.4.3 Soil

The methodology for estimating potential impacts to soil is described in detail in Appendix C and Tomasko (1997).

F.3.4.3.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Potential impacts to soil could occur during construction, normal operations, and postulated accident scenarios. These impacts include changes in topography, permeability, quality, and erosion potential. The impacts are evaluated over a range of conditions present at the representative sites and are also applicable for a similarly sized generic site located in the vicinity of a major river.

Paving and construction would alter about 13 acres (5.3 ha) and potentially disturb up to 20 acres (8.1 ha) (LLNL 1997). Soil beneath the buildings and paved areas may be altered permanently. Although the alteration of these lands might be permanent, the net impact would be negligible in comparison to the representative land areas involved (ranging from 0.3 to 0.8% of the land area available). A larger range of values is associated with the potential land area disturbed (ranging from 0.5 to 1.2% of the land area available). These impacts could include increased permeability, modification of the local topography, changes in the soil chemistry, and increases in the potential for soil erosion. These impacts would, however, be insignificant on a sitewide scale. In addition, impacts to these areas would be mitigated with time (e.g., disturbed soil would be regraded to natural contours and seeded with natural vegetation, thereby returning the soils to their original condition).

By following good engineering practices (e.g., disturbing as little soil as possible, contouring and reseeding disturbed lands, scheduling construction activities to minimize land disturbance, controlling runoff, using tarps to prevent chemical/precipitation interactions, and cleaning up any spills as soon as they occurred), negligible impacts to soils should occur.

Because normal operations would not affect soil, there would be no soil impacts. The only accident identified that could potentially impact the soil is an HF pipeline rupture (Table F.21), discussed in Section F.3.4.1.1. Because of rapid mitigation (any contaminated soil would be cleaned up within 48 hours of the rupture) and the small release volume (60 gal of HF), impacts to the soil would be negligible.

F.3.4.3.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

The environmental parameters associated with the UO$_2$ conversion alternatives are very similar to those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (Table F.21). Because of these similarities, impacts to soil for UO$_2$ conversion would be negligible.

F.3.4.3.3 Conversion to Metal

The environmental parameters associated with the metal conversion alternatives are very similar to those for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion (Table F.21). Because of these similarities, impacts to soils would be essentially the same as those previously presented, i.e., none to negligible.

F.3.4.3.4 Cylinder Treatment Facility

For the cylinder treatment facility, the only impacts would occur during construction. There would be no discharges to the ground under normal operations, and there are no accidents identified in LLNL (1997) that would lead to direct contamination of the soil. Impacts from construction would include changes in topography, permeability, quality, and erosion potential. By following good engineering and construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps, cleaning up chemical spills as soon as they occur, and providing retention basins to catch and hold any contaminated surface runoff), impacts to soil quality would be negligible.

F.3.5 Socioeconomics

The impact of each conversion option on socioeconomic activity was estimated for a region of influence (ROI) at the three representative sites. The assessment methodology is discussed in Appendix C and Allison and Folga (1997).

Each of the conversion options is likely to have a small impact on socioeconomic conditions in the ROIs surrounding the three representative sites described in Chapter 3, Sections 3.1.8, 3.2.8, and 3.3.8. This is largely because a major proportion of the expenditures associated with procurement for the construction and operation of each technology option flows

outside the ROI to other locations in the United States, reducing the concentration of local economic effects of each conversion option.

Slight changes in employment and income would occur in each ROI as a result of local spending of personal consumption expenditures derived from employee wages and salaries, local procurement of goods and services required to construct and operate each conversion option, and other local investment associated with construction and operation. In addition to creating new (direct) jobs at each site, each conversion option would also create indirect employment and income in the ROI as a result of jobs and procurement expenditures at each site. Jobs and income created directly by each conversion option, together with indirect activity in the ROI, would contribute slightly to reduction in unemployment in the ROI surrounding each site. Minimal impacts are expected on local population growth, and consequently on local housing markets and local fiscal conditions.

The effects of constructing and operating each conversion technology on regional economic activity (measured in terms of employment and personal income) and on population, housing, and local public revenues and expenditures are described in Sections F.3.5.1 through F.3.5.4. Impacts are presented as ranges to include impacts that would occur with each conversion option and for the cylinder treatment facility at each of the representative sites. Impacts for the three sites are presented for the peak year of construction (assumed to be 2006) and the first year of operations (assumed to be 2009). The potential impacts for each conversion option and for the cylinder treatment facility are presented in Table F.23.

F.3.5.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

During the peak year of construction of a U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility, between 240 and 250 direct jobs would be created at the site and 170 to 330 additional jobs would be created indirectly in the site ROI (Table F.23) as a result of the spending of employee wages and salaries and procurement-related expenditures. Overall, 410 to 580 jobs would be created. Construction activity would also produce direct and indirect income in the ROI surrounding the site, with total income ranging from \$14 million to \$17 million during the peak year. During the first year of operations of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility, 440 to 510 direct and indirect jobs would be created. Direct and indirect income would also be produced in the ROIs, with total income ranging from \$14 million to \$15 million. Construction and operation of the conversion facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI employment of 0.01 to 0.05 percentage points from 1999 through 2028.

Construction of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would be expected to generate direct in-migration of 330 to 340 people in the peak year of construction at the site. Additional indirect job in-migration would also be expected in the site ROIs, bringing the total number of in-migrants to between 410 and 470 in the peak year (Table F.23). Operation of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would be expected to generate direct and indirect job in-migration of 220 to 340 in the first year of

TABLE F.23 Potential Socioeconomic Impacts of the Conversion Options

	Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$		Conversion to UO$_2$	
	Construction[a]	Operations[b]	Construction[a]	Operations[b]
Economic activity in the ROI				
Direct jobs	240 – 250	200 – 210	330 – 630	230 – 360
Indirect jobs	170 – 330	240 – 300	230 – 730	310 – 920
Total jobs	410 – 580	440 – 510	560 – 1,400	500 – 1,300
Income ($ million)				
Direct income	11	10	15 – 28	11 – 18
Total income	14 – 17	14 – 15	19 – 42	16 – 28
Population in-migration into the ROI	410 – 470	220 – 340	570 – 1,200	210 – 1,100
Housing demand				
Number of units in the ROI	150 – 170	80 – 130	210 – 440	80 – 390
Public finances				
Change in ROI fiscal balance (%)	0.1 – 0.3	<0.1 – 0.2	0.1 – 0.7	<0.1 – 0.6

	Conversion to Uranium Metal		Cylinder Treatment Facility	
	Construction[a]	Operations[b]	Construction[a]	Operations[b]
Economic activity in the ROI				
Direct jobs	380 – 440	210 – 370	100	130
Indirect jobs	230 – 470	310 – 520	40 – 80	130 – 180
Total jobs	610 – 910	520 – 890	150 – 180	260 – 310
Income ($ million)				
Direct income	12 – 16	10 – 18	5	10
Total income	15 – 25	15 – 27	5 – 6	13 – 14
Population in-migration into the ROI	650 – 790	240 – 630	160 – 180	240 – 300
Housing demand				
Number of units in the ROI	240 – 290	90 – 230	60 – 70	90 – 110
Public finances				
Change in ROI fiscal balance (%)	0.1 – 0.5	<0.1 – 0.4	<0.0 – 0.1	<0.0 – 0.2

[a] Impacts are for the peak year of construction, 2007. Socioeconomic impacts were assessed for 1999 through 2008.

[b] Impacts are the annual averages for operations for the period 2009 through 2028.

operations. Construction and operation of the facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI population of less than 0.01 to 0.04 percentage points from 1998 through 2028.

A U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would generate a demand for 150 to 170 additional rental housing units during the peak year of construction (Table F.23), representing an impact of 2.7-11% on the projected number of vacant rental housing units in the representative site ROIs. A demand for 80 to 130 additional owner-occupied housing units would be expected in the first year of operations, representing an impact of 0.7 to 2.7% on the number of vacant owner-occupied housing units in the ROIs.

During the peak year of construction, 410 to 470 people would be expected to in-migrate into the ROI at the site, leading to increases of between 0.1 and 0.3% over forecasted baseline revenues and expenditures in the representative site ROI (Table F.23). In the first year of operations, 220 to 340 in-migrants would be expected, leading to increases of less than 0.1 to 0.2% in local revenues and expenditures.

F.3.5.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

During the peak year of construction of a UO$_2$ conversion facility, 330 to 630 direct jobs would be created at the site and 230 to 730 additional jobs indirectly in the site ROI (Table F.23) as a result of the spending of employee wages and salaries and procurement-related expenditures. Overall, 560 to 1,400 jobs would be created. Construction activity would also produce direct and indirect income in the ROI surrounding the site, with total income ranging from $19 million to $42 million during the peak year. During the first year of operations of the UO$_2$ conversion facility, 540 to 1,200 direct and indirect jobs would be created. Direct and indirect income would also be produced in the ROI, with total income ranging from $16 million to $28 million. Construction and operation of the conversion facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI employment of 0.01 to 0.1 percentage points from 1999 through 2028.

Construction of the UO$_2$ conversion facility would be expected to generate direct in-migration of 460 to 860 people in the peak year of construction at the site. Additional indirect job in-migration would also be expected in the site ROIs, bringing the total number of in-migrants to between 570 and 1,200 in the peak year (Table F.23). Operation of the UO$_2$ conversion facility would be expected to generate direct and indirect job in-migration of 210 to 1,100 in the first year of operations. Construction and operation of the facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI population of less than 0.01 to 0.06 percentage points from 1999 through 2028.

The UO$_2$ conversion facility would generate a demand for 210 to 440 additional rental housing units during the peak year of construction, representing an impact of 3.8 to 28% on the

projected number of vacant rental housing units in the representative site ROIs (Table F.23). A demand for 80 to 390 additional owner-occupied housing units would be expected in the first year of operations, representing an impact of 0.7 to 8.2% on the number of vacant owner-occupied housing units in the ROIs.

During the peak year of construction, 570 to 1,200 people would be expected to in-migrate into the ROI at the site, leading to increases of 0.1 to 0.7% over forecasted baseline revenues and expenditures in the representative site ROIs (Table F.23). In the first year of operations, 210 to 1,100 in-migrants would be expected, leading to increases of less than 0.1 to 0.6% in local revenues and expenditures.

F.3.5.3 Conversion to Metal

During the peak year of construction of a metal conversion facility, 380 to 440 direct jobs would be created at the site and 230 to 470 additional jobs indirectly in the site ROI (Table F.23) as a result of the spending of employee wages and salaries and procurement-related expenditures. Overall, 610 to 910 jobs would be created. Construction activity would also produce direct and indirect income in the ROI surrounding the site, with total income ranging from $15 million to $25 million during the peak year. During the first year of operations of the metal conversion facility, 520 to 890 direct and indirect jobs would be created. Direct and indirect income would also be produced in the ROI, with total income ranging from $15 million to $27 million. Construction and operation of the conversion facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI employment of 0.01 to 0.09 percentage points from 1999 through 2028.

Construction of the metal conversion facility would be expected to generate direct in-migration of 520 to 600 people in the peak year of construction at the site. Additional indirect job in-migration would also be expected in the site ROI, bringing the total number of in-migrants to between 650 and 790 in the peak year (Table F.23). Operation of the metal conversion facility would be expected to generate direct and indirect job in-migration of 240 to 630 in the first year of operations. Construction and operation of the facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI population of 0.01 to 0.08 percentage points from 1999 through 2028.

The metal conversion facility would generate a demand for 240 to 290 additional rental housing units during the peak year of construction, representing an impact of 4.3 to 18.5% on the projected number of vacant rental housing units in the representative site ROIs (Table F.23). A demand for 90 to 230 additional owner-occupied housing units would be expected in the first year of operations, representing an impact of 0.8 to 4.9% on the number of vacant owner-occupied housing units in the ROI.

During the peak year of construction, 650 to 790 people would be expected to in-migrate into the ROI surrounding the site, leading to increases of 0.1 to 0.5% over forecasted baseline revenues and expenditures in the representative site ROIs (Table F.23). In the first year of operations, 240 to 630 in-migrants would be expected, leading to increases of less than 0.1 to 0.4% in local revenues and expenditures.

F.3.5.4 Cylinder Treatment Facility

During the peak year of construction of a cylinder treatment facility, approximately 100 direct jobs would be created at the site and 40 to 80 additional jobs indirectly in the site ROI (Table F.23) as a result of the spending of employee wages and salaries and procurement-related expenditures. Overall, 150 to 180 jobs would be created. Construction activity would also produce direct and indirect income in the ROI surrounding the site, with total income ranging from $5 million to $6 million during the peak year. During the first year of operations of the cylinder treatment facility, 260 to 310 direct and indirect jobs would be created. Direct and indirect income would also be produced in the ROI, with total income ranging from $13 million to $14 million. Construction and operation of the facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI employment of 0.01 to 0.03 percentage points from 1999 through 2028.

Construction of the cylinder treatment facility would be expected to generate direct in-migration of 140 people in the peak year of construction at the site. Additional indirect job in-migration would also be expected in the site ROI, bringing the total number of in-migrants to between 160 and 180 in the peak year (Table F.23). Operation of the cylinder treatment facility would be expected to generate direct and indirect job in-migration of 240 to 300 in the first year of operations. Construction and operation of the facility would result in an increase in the projected baseline compound annual average growth rate in ROI population of less than 0.01 to 0.02 per-centage points from 1999 through 2028.

The cylinder treatment facility would generate a demand for 60 to 70 additional rental housing units during the peak year of construction, representing an impact of 1.1 to 4.4% on the projected number of vacant rental housing units in the representative site ROIs (Table F.23). A demand for 90 to 110 additional owner-occupied housing units would be expected in the first year of operations, representing an impact of 0.8 to 2.3% on the number of vacant owner-occupied housing units in the ROI.

During the peak year of construction, 160 to 180 people would be expected to in-migrate into the ROI surrounding the site, leading to increases of 0.0 to 0.1% over forecasted baseline revenues and expenditures in the representative site ROIs (Table F.23). In the first year of operations, 240 to 300 in-migrants would be expected, leading to increases of less than 0.1 to 0.2% in local revenues and expenditures.

F.3.6 Ecology

Moderate impacts to ecological resources could result from construction of a conversion facility. Impacts could include mortality of individual organisms, habitat loss, or changes in biotic communities. Impacts due to operation of a conversion facility would be negligible. Potential impacts to vegetation, wildlife, wetlands, and threatened and endangered species were assessed. The methodology used in the ecological impact analysis is discussed in Appendix C.

F.3.6.1 Conversion to U_3O_8

Site preparation for the construction of a facility to convert UF_6 to U_3O_8 would require the disturbance of approximately 20 acres (8 ha), including the permanent replacement of approximately 13 acres (5.3 ha) with structures and paved areas. Existing vegetation would be destroyed during land clearing activities. Determination of the vegetation communities that would be eliminated by site preparation would depend on the future location of the facility. Communities occurring on undeveloped land at the three representative sites are relatively common and well represented in the vicinity of the sites. Impacts to high-quality native plant communities may occur if facility construction requires disturbance to vegetation communities outside of the currently fenced areas (see Section F.3.9 for a discussion of land use). Construction of the conversion facility would not be expected to threaten the local population of any species. The loss of up to 20 acres (8 ha) of undeveloped land would constitute a moderate adverse impact. Erosion of exposed soil at construction sites could reduce the effectiveness of restoration efforts and create sedimentation downgradient of the site. The implementation of standard erosion control measures, installation of storm-water retention ponds, and immediate replanting of disturbed areas with native species would help minimize impacts to vegetation. Impacts due to facility construction are shown in Table F.24.

Wildlife would be disturbed by land clearing, noise, and human presence. Wildlife with restricted mobility, such as burrowing species or juveniles of nesting species, would be destroyed during land clearing activities. More mobile individuals would relocate to adjacent available areas with suitable habitat. Population densities, and thus competition for food and nesting sites, would increase in these areas, potentially reducing the survivability or reproductive capacity of displaced individuals. Many wildlife species would be expected to quickly recolonize replanted areas near the conversion facility following completion of construction. The permanent loss of up to 13 acres (5.3 ha) of habitat would not be expected to threaten the local population of any wildlife species because similar habitat would be available in the vicinity of the sites. Therefore, construction of a conversion facility for U_3O_8 production would be considered a moderate adverse impact to wildlife.

Impacts to surface water and groundwater quality during construction are expected to be negligible (Section F.3.4). Thus, construction-derived impacts to aquatic biota would also be expected to be negligible. Wetlands could potentially be impacted by filling or draining during construction. Impacts to wetlands due to alteration of surface water runoff patterns, soil compaction, or groundwater flow could occur if the conversion facility were located immediately adjacent to

TABLE F.24 Impacts to Ecological Resources from Construction of a Conversion Facility and Cylinder Treatment Facility

Option/Resource	Type of Impact	Degree of Impact
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$		
Vegetation	Loss of 20 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wildlife	Loss of 13 to 20 acres	Minor to moderate adverse impact
Wetlands	Loss, degradation	Potential adverse impact
Aquatic species	Water quality, habitat reduction	Negligible impact
Protected species	Destruction, habitat loss	Potential adverse impact
Conversion to UO$_2$		
Vegetation	Loss of 22 to 31 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wildlife	Loss of 14 to 31 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wetlands	Loss, degradation	Potential adverse impact
Aquatic species	Water quality, habitat reduction	Negligible impact
Protected species	Destruction, habitat loss	Potential adverse impact
Conversion to metal		
Vegetation	Loss of 23 to 26 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wildlife	Loss of 15 to 26 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wetlands	Loss, degradation	Potential adverse impact
Aquatic species	Water quality, habitat reduction	Negligible impact
Protected species	Destruction, habitat loss	Potential adverse impact
Cylinder treatment facility		
Vegetation	Loss of 9 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wildlife	Loss of 5 to 9 acres	Moderate adverse impact
Wetlands	Loss, degradation	Potential adverse impact
Aquatic species	Water quality, habitat reduction	Negligible impact
Protected species	Destruction, habitat loss	Potential adverse impact

wetland areas. However, impacts to wetlands would be minimized by maintaining a buffer area around wetlands during construction of the facility. Unavoidable impacts to wetlands would require a *Clean Water Act* Section 404 permit, which might stipulate mitigative measures. Additional permitting might be required by state agencies.

Critical habitat has not been designated for any state or federally listed threatened or endangered species at any of the representative sites. Prior to construction of a conversion facility, a site-specific survey for federal- and state-listed threatened, endangered, or candidate species or

species of special concern would be conducted. Impacts to these species could thus be avoided or, where impacts were unavoidable, appropriate mitigation could be developed.

During operations, ecological resources in the vicinity of the conversion facility would be exposed to atmospheric emissions from the boiler stack and process stack; however, emission levels would be expected to be extremely low (Section F.3.3.2). The highest annual average air concentration of U_3O_8 at a representative site boundary would be less than 2.6×10^{-5} µg/m^3. This would result in a radiation exposure to the general public (nearly 100% due to inhalation) of less than 0.009 mrem/yr (Section F.3.1.1), well below the DOE guidelines of 100 mrem/yr (0.00027 rad/d). Wildlife species are less sensitive to radiation than humans (proposed DOE guidelines would require an absorbed dose limit to terrestrial animals of 0.1 rad/d). Therefore, impacts to wildlife due to radiation effects would be expected to be negligible. Toxic effects of chronic inhalation of U_3O_8 are minor at a concentration of 17 mg/m^3 for tested animal species. This is many orders of magnitude greater than expected emissions. Therefore, toxic effects to wildlife due to U_3O_8 inhalation would also be expected to be negligible. See Appendix C for further discussion.

The maximum annual average air concentration of hydrogen fluoride at a site boundary, due to operation of a conversion facility, would be less than 0.0073 µg/m^3 (Section F.3.3.2). Chronic exposure to HF gas produces only mild effects in tested animal species at concentrations as high as 7 mg/m^3, considerably higher than expected emissions. Therefore, toxic effects to wildlife from HF emissions would be expected to be negligible.

A portion of the U_3O_8 released from the process stack of a conversion facility would become deposited on the soils surrounding the site. Uptake of uranium-containing compounds can cause adverse effects to vegetation. Deposition of U_3O_8 on soils, resulting from atmospheric emissions, would result in soil uranium concentrations considerably below the lowest concentration known to produce toxic effects in plants. Therefore, toxic effects on vegetation due to U_3O_8 uptake would be expected to be negligible.

Effluent discharges to surface waters would result in a uranium concentration of about 12 pCi/L (0.03 mg/L) as uranyl nitrate (Section F.3.4.1). Resulting dose rates to maximally exposed organisms would be considerably lower than the dose limit of 1 rad/d for aquatic organisms, which is required by DOE Order 5400.5. Uranyl nitrate concentrations in the effluent also would be considerably lower than 0.15 mg/L, the lowest concentration known to cause toxic effects in aquatic biota. Mixing of the effluent with surface water downstream of the outfall would result in a dilution factor of more than 50,000. Therefore, impacts to aquatic biota would be considered to be negligible.

For the U_3O_8 conversion process, water withdrawal from surface waters or groundwater, as well as wastewater discharge, could potentially alter water levels which could in turn affect aquatic ecosystems including wetlands (including wetlands located along the periphery of these surface water bodies). However, water level changes due to process water withdrawal and wastewater discharge would be negligible (Section F.3.4.1). Therefore, impacts to wetlands would be expected to be negligible.

A potential release of contaminants due to the occurrence of an earthquake was analyzed. The subsequent rupture of an HF pipeline would potentially release anhydrous HF into the surrounding soil, surface water, or groundwater. Due to the brief duration of the release, the small volume involved, and rapid mitigation, the expected impacts to surface water, groundwater, and soil would be negligible (Section F.3.4). Therefore, impacts to ecological resources from such an accident would also be expected to be negligible. Facility accidents, as discussed in Section F.3.2, could result in adverse impacts to ecological resources. The affected species and the degree of impact would depend on a number of factors such as location of the accident, season, and meteorological conditions.

F.3.6.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

The construction of a facility to convert depleted UF$_6$ to UO$_2$ would generally result in the types of impacts associated with conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. Site preparation for the construction of a facility to convert depleted UF$_6$ to UO$_2$ would require the disturbance of approximately 22 to 31 acres (8.9 to 12.5 ha), including the permanent replacement of approximately 14 to 19 acres (5.5 to 7.8 ha) with structures and paved areas. The loss of 22 to 31 acres (8.9 to 12.5 ha) of undeveloped land would constitute a moderate adverse impact to vegetation. The permanent loss of up to 19 acres (7.8 ha) of habitat would not be expected to threaten the local population of any wildlife species because similar habitat would be available in the vicinity of the representative sites. However, habitat use in the vicinity of the facility might be greatly reduced for many species due to the construction of a perimeter fence. Consequently, the construction of a conversion facility for UO$_2$ production is considered a moderate adverse impact to wildlife.

Impacts to surface water and groundwater quality during construction would be expected to be negligible (Section F.3.4). Thus, construction-derived impacts to aquatic biota would also be expected to be negligible. Impacts to wetlands and protected species due to facility construction would be similar to impacts associated with conversion to U$_3$O$_8$.

During operations, exposures to contaminants from conversion to UO$_2$ would generally be slightly larger than for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$, but all exposures would be well below levels that might produce adverse effects. All impacts would therefore be negligible. Impacts to ecological resources from accident scenarios would be as discussed for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ (Section F.3.6.1).

F.3.6.3 Conversion to Metal

Construction of a facility to convert depleted UF$_6$ to uranium metal would generally result in the types of impacts associated with conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. Site preparation would require the disturbance of approximately 23 to 26 acres (9.4 to 11 ha), including the permanent replacement of about 15 to 16 acres (6.2 to 6.5 ha) with structures and paved areas. The loss of 23 to 26 acres (9.4

to 11 ha) of undeveloped land would constitute a moderate adverse impact to vegetation and wildlife. Impacts due to facility construction are shown in Table F.24.

During operation of the metal conversion facility, exposure to contaminants would be considerably below levels known to cause toxic effects in biota. The resulting impacts would therefore be negligible. Impacts to ecological resources from accidents would be as discussed for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ (Section F.3.6.1).

Construction of a cylinder treatment facility would generally result in the types of impacts associated with construction of a conversion facility; however, the area affected would be smaller (Table F.24). Site preparation for constructing a cylinder treatment facility would require the disturbance of approximately 9 acres (4 ha). About 5 acres (2 ha) would be permanently replaced with structures, paved areas, and landscaping. The loss of 9 acres (4 ha) of undeveloped land would constitute a moderate adverse impact to vegetation and wildlife. Exposure to contaminants resulting from operation of a cylinder treatment facility would be considerably below levels known to result in toxic effects to biota. The resulting impacts would therefore be negligible.

F.3.7 Waste Management

Impacts on waste management from wastes generated during construction and normal operations at the depleted UF$_6$ conversion facilities would be caused by the potential overload of waste treatment and/or disposal capabilities either at a site or on a regional/national scale. The types of wastes that are expected to be generated by the depleted UF$_6$ conversion include low-level radioactive waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, and nonhazardous wastewater. Currently, there are numerous DOE and commercial facilities that treat and/or dispose of LLW, hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, and wastewaters. The treatment/disposal of LLMW is limited by regulatory and technological restrictions.

F.3.7.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Construction of a facility to convert UF$_6$ into U$_3$O$_8$ would generate both hazardous and nonhazardous wastes. Approximately 115 m^3 of hazardous waste, 700 m^3 of nonhazardous solid waste, and 15,000 m^3 of wastewater would be generated during construction (see Table F.25). This compares with existing contributions for hazardous waste ranging from approximately 80 m^3/yr to 1,000 m^3/yr, solid waste loads for the representative sites of 2,100 to 28,000 m^3/yr, and wastewater loads of 500,000 to 880,000 m^3 annually for the representative sites (see Appendix C, Table C.3). No radioactive waste would be generated during the construction phase of the facility. Overall, only minimal waste management impacts would result from construction-generated wastes.

Operations at the facility to convert UF$_6$ into U$_3$O$_8$ would generate radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes (Table F.25). The conversion facility would generate 140 to 600 m^3/yr of

TABLE F.25 Wastes Generated from Construction and Operations Activities for Depleted UF$_6$ Conversion[a]

Activity/ Waste Category	Volume Ranges for the Options		
	Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	Conversion to UO$_2$	Conversion to Metal
Construction[a] (m^3)			
Low-level waste	–	–	–
Low-level mixed waste	–	–	–
Hazardous waste	115	140 – 200	140 – 180
Nonhazardous waste			
Solids	700	1,300	860 – 1,130
Wastewater	3,800	7,600	5,700 – 7,580
Sanitary wastewater	11,400	17,000	13,200 – 15,200
Operations (m^3/yr)			
Low-level waste			
Combustible waste	76.5	88.0 – 136	76.5 – 420
Noncombustible	62 – 68.2	82.0 – 140	112 – 470
Grouted	0 – 466	0 – 466	0 – 997
Total	140 – 600	170 – 740	190 – 1,890
Low-level mixed waste	1.1	1.1 – 8.8	1.1
Hazardous waste	7.32	7.32 – 17	7.32 – 9.5
Nonhazardous waste			
Solids	380 – 11,000[b]	520 – 30,600[b]	6,580 – 6,840[c]
Wastewater	58,000 – 87,100	74,900 – 510,000	94,000 – 96,500
Sanitary wastewater	4,540 – 4,920	5,680 – 8,700	5,300 – 8,700

[a] Total waste generated during construction period of 4 years.

[b] Includes 240 to 10,630 m^3 of CaF$_2$.

[c] Includes 67 m^3 of CaF$_2$ and 5,850 to 6,110 m^3 of MgF$_2$.

LLW, which, at the upper end, represents approximately 7 to 27% of the representative site LLW loads (see Appendix C, Table C.3). The U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility waste input would represent less than 1% of DOE LLW generation. The U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would generate approximately 1.1 m^3/yr of LLMW, which is less than 1% of the LLMW generation at the representative sites (ranging from 100 to 5,000 m^3/yr LLMW) (see Appendix C, Table C.3). The U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would generate approximately 7 m^3/yr of hazardous waste, which would result in an increase of about 1 to 10% of the hazardous waste loads at the representative sites; and about 60,000 to

90,000 m^3/yr of wastewater, representing between 9 and 17% of the current loads for wastewater at the representative sites.

The CaF$_2$ potentially produced in the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion process was assumed to have a uranium content of less than 1 ppm (LLNL 1997). It is currently unknown whether this CaF$_2$ could be sold (e.g., as feedstock for commercial production of anhydrous HF) or whether the low uranium content would require disposal as either a nonhazardous solid waste or as LLW. The nonhazardous solid waste generation estimates for conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ and UO$_2$, as shown in Table F.25, are based on the assumption that CaF$_2$ would be disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, generating approximately 380 to 11,000 m^3/yr of nonhazardous solid waste (from 18 to 500% of the current nonhazardous solid waste loads at the representative sites, depending on the conversion technology chosen). If CaF$_2$ were considered to be LLW, it would represent an additional 3 to 480% of the current LLW loads at the representative sites. The upper end of the range of nonhazardous and LLW volume increases (which correspond to the HF neutralization process) would constitute a potentially large impact to either nonhazardous or LLW management activities at an actual site. Disposal as LLW might require the CaF$_2$ to be grouted, generating up to 21,300 m^3/yr of grouted waste. The maximum volume of LLW generated would still represent less than 10.4% of the projected DOE complexwide LLW disposal volume, constituting a moderate impact with respect to complexwide LLW management. It is also unknown whether CaF$_2$ LLW would be considered DOE waste if the conversion were conducted by a private commercial enterprise. If CaF$_2$ could be sold, the nonhazardous solid waste or LLW management impacts would be reduced to a low level for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion technologies.

The impacts from normal operation of the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would range from negligible to large, depending upon the choice of technology and the ultimate generation volumes and disposition of CaF$_2$ for the facility. Overall, the waste input resulting from normal operations at the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would be expected to have a moderate impact on waste management. If CaF$_2$ were disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, the increased input could be managed by expanding the capacity of the nonhazardous solid waste disposal facilities at the actual site.

F.3.7.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

Construction of a facility to convert UF$_6$ into UO$_2$ would generate approximately the same quantity of hazardous wastes as conversion to U$_3$O$_8$. Construction would generate approximately 1,300 m^3 of solid nonhazardous wastes and up to 24,000 m^3 of wastewater (see Table F.25). These waste loads are well below the representative site waste inputs for comparable wastes. No radioactive waste would be generated during the construction phase of the facility. Overall, only minimal waste management impacts would result from construction-generated wastes.

Operations at the facility to convert UF$_6$ into UO$_2$ would generate radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes (Table F.25). The conversion facility would generate about 9 to 33% of the representative site LLW loads (see Appendix C, Table C.3). The UO$_2$ conversion facility would

generate up to 465 m^3/yr of a solid, grouted LLW that would require off-site disposal. The conversion facility LLW input would represent less than 1% of the projected annual DOE LLW treatment volume. The UO$_2$ conversion facility would generate from 1 to 9% of the LLMW generation for the representative sites (see Appendix C, Table C.3). The UO$_2$ conversion facility would generate 7 to 17 m^3/yr of hazardous waste, which would result in a minor increase to the hazardous waste load from routine operations at the representative site. The UO$_2$ conversion facility would add 520 to 30,600 m^3/yr of nonhazardous solid waste and about 80,000 to 500,000 m^3/yr of wastewater (see Table F.25).

As in the U$_3$O$_8$ conversion option, it is currently unknown whether CaF$_2$ generated in the conversion to UO$_2$ option could be sold or whether the low uranium content (less than 1 ppm) would require disposal as either a nonhazardous solid waste or as LLW. The nonhazardous solid waste generation estimates for conversion to UO$_2$ shown in Table F.25 are based on the assumption that CaF$_2$ would be disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, generating about 240 to 11,000 m^3/yr of nonhazardous solid waste (up to 500% of the current nonhazardous solid waste loads at the representative sites, depending on the conversion technology chosen). If CaF$_2$ were considered to be LLW, it would represent up to 480% of the current LLW loads at the representative sites. The upper end of the range of nonhazardous and LLW volume increases (which correspond to the HF neutralization process) would constitute a potentially large impact to either nonhazardous or LLW management activities at an actual site. Disposal as a LLW might require the CaF$_2$ to be grouted, generating up to 21,300 m^3/yr of grouted waste. However, the maximum volume of LLW generated would still represent less than 10.4% of the projected DOE complexwide LLW disposal volume, constituting a moderate impact with respect to complexwide LLW management, if the CAF$_2$ were considered DOE waste. If CaF$_2$ could be sold, the nonhazardous solid waste or LLW management impacts would be reduced to a low level for UO$_2$ conversion technologies.

The large range in the expected volume of nonhazardous solid waste and wastewater is also a result of differences in UO$_2$ conversion technologies. The gelation technology would result in the highest nonhazardous waste generation volumes. The range of 520 to 30,600 m^3/yr for nonhazardous solid wastes represents an approximate range of 2 to 1,500% (15 times) the annual nonhazardous solid waste production at the representative sites. The estimated range for wastewater generation represents a range of about 13 to 115% of the annual wastewater generation at the representative sites.

The impacts from normal operation of the UO$_2$ conversion facility would range from negligible to large, depending upon the choice of technology for this facility. Overall, the waste input resulting from normal operations at the UO$_2$ conversion facility would be expected to have a moderate impact on waste management. The increased solid waste input could be managed by expanding the capacity of the solid nonhazardous waste disposal facilities at the sites. The increased wastewater input would be handled by existing site wastewater capabilities of the representative sites.

F.3.7.3 Conversion to Metal

Construction of the facility to convert UF$_6$ into uranium metal would generate approximately the same quantity of hazardous and nonhazardous wastes as conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ or UO$_2$ (Table F.25). No radioactive waste would be generated during the construction phase of the facility. Overall, only minimal waste management impacts would result from construction-generated wastes.

Operations at the facility to convert UF$_6$ into uranium metal would generate radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes (Table F.25). The conversion facility would generate about 23 to 85% of the representative site LLW loads (see Appendix C, Table C.3). A metal conversion facility LLW input would represent less than 3% of the projected annual DOE LLW treatment volume. The metal conversion facility would generate less than 1% of the LLMW generation at the representative sites (see Appendix C, Table C.3) and less than 12% of the hazardous waste load from routine operations at the three representative sites. The metal conversion facility would add from 25 to 325% of the existing representative site solid waste load and from 12 to 20% of the load for wastewater. The increased solid waste input could be managed by expanding the disposal capacity of the solid nonhazardous waste disposal facilities at the actual site.

It is possible that the MgF$_2$ waste generated in the conversion to metal option would be sufficiently contaminated with uranium to require disposal as LLW rather than as solid nonhazardous waste. The uranium level in the MgF$_2$ is estimated to be about 90 ppm (LLNL 1997). Such disposal might require the MgF$_2$ waste to be grouted, generating about 6,150 to 12,300 m^3/yr of grouted waste for LLW disposal. This volume range represents about 72 to 560% of the current LLW generation for the representative three sites (see Appendix C, Table C.3). However, it would represent less than 6% of the projected DOE complexwide LLW disposal volume, constituting a low impact with respect to complexwide LLW management, if the MgF$_2$ were considered a DOE waste.

Neutralization of HF to CaF$_2$ was not explicitly analyzed in the engineering analysis report for the conversion to metal options (LLNL 1997). However, the process could be implemented and would produce approximately one-third as much CaF$_2$ as would be produced under the conversion to oxide with neutralization options (i.e., approximately 3,500 m^3/yr of CaF$_2$). If this CaF$_2$ waste were disposed of as LLW, it would constitute less than 3% of the DOE complexwide LLW disposal volume, representing a low impact with respect to complexwide LLW management.

Overall, the waste input resulting from normal operations at the uranium metal conversion facility would have a moderate impact on waste management.

F.3.7.4 Cylinder Treatment Facility

All of the conversion options would require the removal of depleted UF$_6$ from the storage cylinders, resulting in a large number of empty cylinders. These empty UF$_6$ cylinders from the conversion facility would be decontaminated at the cylinder treatment facility and then prepared for

disposal as scrap metal. It was assumed for this assessment that the cylinder treatment facility would be washing the empty cylinders with water to remove the "heels" of depleted UF$_6$. The resulting aqueous wash solution would be evaporated and converted to solid U$_3$O$_8$ and HF. The U$_3$O$_8$ would be packaged and sent for disposal. The HF would be neutralized to CaF$_2$ and separately packaged for either disposal or sale.

Construction of the cylinder treatment facility would generate both hazardous and nonhazardous wastes. These waste quantities — hazardous, 18 m^3; solid nonhazardous, 300 m^3; and sanitary and other nonhazardous liquids, 28,000 m^3 — all represent only minimal waste management impacts at any of the three potential sites. No radioactive waste would be generated during construction of this facility.

The amounts of waste generated annually during operation of the cylinder treatment facility are given in Table F.26. Included are crushed old cylinders and wastes obtained (U$_3$O$_8$ and CaF$_2$) from disposal of the "heels." All of these wastes, except the crushed old cylinders, represent only negligible impacts to the waste management system. Over 20 years of operations, the crushed old cylinders (2,322 cylinders/yr) would generate about 125,000 m^3 (6,190 m^3/yr × 20 years) of waste volume for disposal. It was assumed that the treated cylinders with a very low residual radiation level

TABLE F.26 Annual Waste Generation during Operation of the Cylinder Treatment Facility

Waste Category	Volume (m^3/yr)
Low-level waste	
Combustible solids	31
Contaminated metal and other noncombustible solids	11
U$_3$O$_8$	6.3
Low-level mixed waste	0.2
Hazardous waste	2
Nonhazardous waste	
Solids	100
Wastewater	6,400
CaF$_2$	14
Sanitary waste	2,300
Crushed cylinders	6,190

would become part of the DOE scrap metal inventory. If a disposal decision were made, the treated cylinders would be disposed of as LLW, representing a 3% addition to the projected DOE complexwide LLW disposal volume.

F.3.7.5 Summary

The impacts from the uranium metal conversion facility would be greater than the waste management impacts resulting from operations of U$_3$O$_8$ conversion, unless CaF$_2$ required disposal as a waste. In the latter case, the impacts to waste management facilities for U$_3$O$_8$ conversion would probably exceed those for uranium metal conversion. The largest waste volumes would result from conversion to UO$_2$.

F.3.8 Resource Requirements

Utilities and materials required for constructing the conversion facility for UF$_6$ to U$_3$O$_8$, UO$_2$, or uranium metal are listed in Table F.27. The equipment for conversion processes would be purchased from equipment vendors. The total quantities of commonly used materials of construction (e.g, carbon steel, stainless steel) for equipment would be minor compared to the quantities required for facility construction, as listed in Table F.27. The primary specialty materials required for fabricating process equipment include Monel and Inconel (LLNL 1997). Utilities and materials required for operating the three conversion facilities are shown in Table F.28.

F.3.9 Land Use

F.3.9.1 Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$

Impacts to land use from the construction and operation of a U$_3$O$_8$ conversion facility would be negligible. Such impacts would be limited to the clearing of required land, minor and temporary disruptions to contiguous land parcels, and a slight increase in vehicular traffic. Under this conversion option, a conversion facility would require approximately 20 acres (8 ha) for construction and about 13 acres (5 ha) for operation (see Table F.29). The construction phase requires more land because space is needed for material excavation storage, equipment staging, and construction material laydown areas.

The amount of land required for this conversion option would not be great enough to require major land modification. However, it should be noted that siting a conversion facility at a location that is already dedicated to similar use could result in fewer land-use impacts because immediate access to infrastructure and utility support would be possible with only minor disturbances to existing land use.

TABLE F.27 Resource Requirements for Constructing a Conversion Facility

		Total Consumption		
Utilities/Materials	Unit	Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	Conversion to UO$_2$	Conversion to Metal
Utilities				
Electricity[a]	MWh	30,000	35,000	35,000 – 45,000
Solids				
Concrete	yd^3	15,000 – 18,000	21,000 – 44,300	20,000 – 23,000
Steel (carbon or mild)	ton	6,000 – 7,000	8,000 – 8,800	9,000 – 10,000
Liquids				
Diesel fuel	million gal	0.75	0.45 – 0.80	0.80 – 1.0
Gasoline	million gal	0.75	0.40 – 0.80	0.80 – 1.0
Gases				
Industrial gases (propane)	gal	4,000	4,400	4,400 – 5,500
Specialty materials				
Monel	ton	15 – 30	25 – 88	20 – 100
Inconel	ton	10	10 – 88	0 – 4
Titanium	ton	NA[b]	0 – 33	0 – 10

[a] The peak electricity demand during any hour would be as follows: conversion to U$_3$O$_8$, about 1.5 MW; conversion to UO$_2$, about 1.5 MW; conversion to metal, from 1.5 to 2.5 MW.

[b] NA = not applicable.

Source: LLNL (1997).

Impacts to land use outside the boundaries of a conversion facility would include negligible and temporary traffic impacts associated with project construction peaks. Also, because of the handling of UF$_6$ at the facility, NUREG-1140 (McGuire 1985) suggests that a 1-mile protective action distance be established around such a facility, which would cover an area of about 960 acres. The protective action distance is the recommended distance for which emergency planning would be appropriate to mitigate off-site exposure to accidental releases.

F.3.9.2 Conversion to UO$_2$

Impacts to land use from the UO$_2$ conversion option would be only slightly greater than those associated with other conversion options. The areal requirements for this option range from

TABLE F.28 Resource Requirements for Operating a Conversion Facility

Utilities/Materials	Unit	Average Annual Requirement		
		Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	Conversion to UO$_2$	Conversion to Metal
Utilities				
Electricity[a]	GWh	11.0	24 – 29	25 – 44
Liquid fuel	gal	6,000	3,040 – 7,000	6,500 – 9,500
Natural gas	million scf[b]	102 – 118	38 – 116	100 – 167
Solids				
Calcium hydroxide (hydrated lime)	million lb	0.388 – 1.27	0.388 – 1.27	0.247
Calcium oxide (quicklime)	million lb	0 – 29	0 – 29	NA[c]
Cement	lb	0 – 862,000	0 – 862,000	0 – 940,000
Detergent	lb	500	600	600 – 700
Iron	million lb	NA	NA	0 – 1.3
Magnesium	million lb	NA	NA	8.4 – 8.6
Sodium chloride	lb	NA	NA	0 – 514,000
Pelletizing lubricant	lb	NA	236,000	NA
Liquids				
Ammonia	million lb	0 – 0.662	2.9	2.4
Hydrochloric acid	lb	11,100 – 18,200	8,900 – 13,600	5,300 – 9,500
Nitric acid	lb	NA	NA	0 – 230,000
Sodium hydroxide	lb	8,800 – 14,400	7,000 – 10,700	4,200 – 7,500

[a] Peak electricity demand during any hour would be as follows: conversion to U$_3$O$_8$, about 1.5 MW; conversion to UO$_2$, from 3.2 to 4.0 MW; conversion to metal, from 3.3 to 6.0 MW.

[b] scf = standard cubic feet measured at 14.7 psia and 60°F.

[c] NA = not applicable.

Source: LLNL (1997).

22 to 31 acres (9 to 13 ha) for construction and from 14 to 20 acres (5.5 to 8 ha) for operations (Table F.29). Siting a conversion facility at a location that is already dedicated to similar use could result in fewer land-use impacts because immediate access to infrastructure and utility support would be possible with only minor disturbances to existing land use.

Impacts to local traffic patterns outside potential UO$_2$ conversion plant sites could be greater than those expected under the conversion to U$_3$O$_8$ option due to the potential for increased traffic volume associated with greater construction workforce demands. However, such impacts would be temporary and would be expected to diminish during the operations phase. The protective

**TABLE F.29 Land Requirements
for the Conversion Options**

Option	Land Requirement (acres)[a]	
	Construction	Operation
Conversion to U$_3$O$_8$	20	13
Conversion UO$_2$	22 – 31	14 – 20
Conversion to metal	23 – 26	15 – 16

[a] NUREG-1140 (McGuire 1985) suggests that each
conversion facility establish a protective action
distance for emergency planning, which would
incorporate an area of about 960 acres around each
facility.

Source: LLNL (1997).

action distance described in Section F.3.9.1 would be applicable to an area of about 960 acres around
the facility.

F.3.9.3 Conversion to Metal

Land-use impacts from the conversion to uranium metal option would be minimal. Land
requirements (Table F.29) would be similar to those discussed for the conversion to UO$_2$ option, and
impacts related to construction traffic outside the conversion plant sites would be negligible. The
protective action distance would be applicable to an area of about 960 acres around the facility.

F.3.9.4 Cylinder Treatment Facility

Impacts to land use from the construction and operation of a cylinder treatment facility
would be negligible and of a lesser magnitude than those generated under any of the conversion
options. Although the cylinder treatment facility could be a stand-alone facility, it is likely to be
integrated into a depleted UF$_6$ conversion facility. If the cylinder treatment facility were incorporated
into a conversion facility, it would require less than 1 acre (0.4 ha) of land, regardless of the
conversion option. Such a small areal requirement would account for much less than 1% of the land
available for development at the representative sites. If construction of a cylinder treatment facility
and conversion facility occurred simultaneously, the peak construction labor force of 230 for the

cylinder treatment facility could slightly increase the magnitude (expected to be negligible) of off-site traffic impacts associated with the conversion facility construction.

As a stand-alone facility, the cylinder treatment facility would require 8.7 acres (3.5 ha) of land for construction and 4.5 acres (2 ha) for operations. The areal requirement would probably not be large enough to result in land-use impacts, particularly if the facility were sited at a location already dedicated to a similar industrial-type use.

F.3.10 Other Impacts Considered But Not Analyzed in Detail

Other impacts that could potentially occur if the conversion options considered in this PEIS were implemented include impacts to cultural resources and environmental justice, as well as impacts to the visual environment (e.g., aesthetics), recreational resources, and noise levels, and impacts associated with decontamination and decommissioning of the conversion facilities. These impacts, although considered, were not analyzed in detail for one or both of the following reasons:

- The impacts could not be determined at the programmatic level without consideration of specific sites (e.g., impacts on cultural resources, threatened and endangered species, wetlands, and environmental justice). These impacts would be more appropriately addressed in the second-tier NEPA documentation when specific sites are considered.

- Consideration of these impacts would not contribute to differentiation among the alternatives and, therefore, would not affect the decisions to be made in the Record of Decision to be issued following publication of this PEIS.

F.4 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX F

Allison, T., and S. Folga, 1997, *Socioeconomic Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to memorandum from T. Allison (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

Charles, L.D., et al., 1991, *Cost Study for the D&D of the GDPs: Depleted Uranium Management and Conversion,* K/D-5940-F, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Cheng, J.-J., et al., 1997, *Human Health Impact Analyses for Normal Operations in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to memorandum from J.-J. Cheng (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

EPA: see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1997, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program; the Engineering Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, UCRL-AR-124080, Volumes I and II, prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Science Applications International Corporation, Bechtel, and Lockheed Martin Energy Systems for U.S. Department of Energy.

LLNL: see Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

McGuire, S.A., 1985, *A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees*, NUREG-1140, Draft Report for Comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June.

National Safety Council, 1995, *Accident Facts*, 1995 Edition, Itasca, Ill.

Nieves, L.A., et al., 1997, *Analysis of Options for Disposition of Empty Depleted UF₆ Cylinders*, attachment to memorandum from L.A. Nieves et al. (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

NRC: see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Policastro, A.J., et al., 1997, *Facility Accident Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to memorandum from A.J. Policastro (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 15.

Tomasko, D., 1997, *Water and Soil Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to memorandum from D. Tomasko (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

Tschanz, J., 1997, *Air Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to memorandum from J. Tschanz (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1996, *Drinking Water Regulations and Health Advisories*, EPA 882-B-96-002, Office of Water, Washington, D.C., Oct., pp. 1-11.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1994, "10 CFR Part 19, et al., Certification of Gaseous | Diffusion Plants; Final Rule," discussion on Section 76.85, "Assessment of Accidents," *Federal* | *Register* 59(184):48954-48955, Sept. 23. |